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INTRODUCTION
The banking and financial industries in the United States and
Mexico are at important crossroads. The paths taken now will have
important repercussions for years to come. In the aftermath of the
massive devaluation of the peso in early 1995, Mexico's private
banking industry virtually collapsed.' As reported by the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund ("IMF"), by early 1995, the peso devaluation
resulted in dramatic increases in interest rates to levels as high as
80%.2 This in turn made it difficult for millions of borrowers to
service their debts, thereby undermining the solvency of Mexican
'See Roy A. Karaoglan and Mike Lubrano, Mexico's Banks After the December
1994 Devaluation: A Chronology of the Government's Response, 16 Nw. J. INT'L
L. & Bus. 1, 2 (1995) (arguing that the devaluation of the peso in late 1994 re-
sulted in the collapse of the private banking industry soon after).
See DAVID FOLKERTS-LANDAU AND TAKATOSHI ITO, INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL
MARKETS: DEVELOPMENT, PROSPECTS, AND POLICY ISSUES 62-63 (International
Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C., Aug. 1995) (analyzing the cause and effect of
monetary changes in the capital markets and interest rates).
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banks.3 The Mexican government headed by President Zedillo
pushed forward with a $65 billion bank bailout plan, as well as plans
to permit foreign ownership of Mexican banking.' The continuing
upheaval and bailout of the Mexican financial sector became some-
thing of a political lightening-rod, highlighting the extreme schisms
between economic classes in Mexico,' particularly between elite
creditor groups and the debtor class that makes up a vast proportion
of the Mexican population.6
In contrast to Mexico's difficulties, banking and finance in the
United States bounced back from its earlier setbacks, such as the
collapse and bailout of the savings and loan industry, the 1987 stock
market decline, and the credit crunch and recession of the early
1990s. 7 The agenda of the United States banking industry is now a
3 See id. (reporting debt-servicing problems of borrowers and resulting decline in
asset quality in both "the peso-denominated and foreign currency loan books of
Mexican banks").
4 See Mike Lubrano, Foreign Investment in the Financial Sector of Mexico, 6 U.S.-
MEX. L.J. 81, 82 (1988) (describing Mexico's relaxed restrictions to attract foreign
investment in its financial sector in the aftermath of the 1994-95 peso crisis); see
also Kenneth Bachman et al., Financial Services Under the North American Free
Trade Agreement: An Overview, 28 INT'L LAW. 291, 305-06 (1994) (discussing the
Mexican government plan to permit foreign investment and assist the financial
sector in regrowth after the 1994 peso crisis).
'See Lucy Conger, Mexicans Oppose Rescue Scheme, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1998, at
4 (discussing the economic sectors both opposing and supporting the attempted fi-
nancial rescue plan); see also Julia Preston, S62 Billion Bank Bailout Plan in
Mexico Incites Outrage as Critics Say It Helps the Rich, N.Y. TIMES, July 31,
1998, at A6 (analyzing the effects of the bailout plan and the objections of certain
sectors of the population).
6 See Julia Preston, Wanted Posters in Mexico Now Feature a White Collar, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 28, 1998, at A14 (reporting the filing of formal petitions to the Mexi-
can Congress to begin impeachment proceedings against Guillermo Ortiz
Martinez, former Finance Minister and head of the Bank of Mexico for funding the
bank bailout program with government debt).
7 See Timothy A. Canova, The Transformation of U.S. Banking and Finance: From
Regulated Competition to Free-Market Receivership, 60 BROOK. L. REv. 1295,
1330-36 (1995) (explaining how the United States banking industry has survived a
series of setbacks).
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multifaceted strategy of continued financial innovation, diversifica-
tion, and expansion, often through merger and consolidation.8 Some
of the largest United States banks expanded by merging with or
buying other commercial banks and non-bank financial institutions."
One of the most notable examples is the announcement of the mega-
merger between Citibank and Travelers Insurance that created Citi-
group, estimated to be worth $70 billion." This merger may spell the
end of the Glass-Steagall Act's prohibitions that separated commer-
cial banking from investment banking and insurance.'1
8 See DEREGULATING FINANCIAL SERVICES: PUBLIC POLICY IN FLUX (G. Kaufman
and R. Kormendi, eds., Ballinger Publishing Co. 1986) (analyzing the current
United States banking industry and the means by which it facilitates its agendas);
see also Trillion Dollar Banks, BUS. WK., Apr. 27, 1998, at 32 (discussing the as-
set value and strategies of major banks within the United States banking industry
and their global agendas).
See Pretty at Citi?, ECONOMIST, Apr. 11, 1998, at 11 (describing the merger be-
tween Citibank and Travelers Insurance); see also Trillion Dollar Banks, supra
note 8, at 32, 35 (asserting that the new Citigroup will have nearly $700 billion in
assets); Michael Siconolfi, Citicorp Merger with Travelers Signals New Era,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 7, 1998, at Al (reporting the merger between Citibank, a com-
mercial bank, and Travelers Insurance, a non-bank financial institution); see gen-
erally Richard Brooks, NationsBank, BankAmerica Holders Vote for $43.02 Bil-
lion Merger Plan, WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 1998, at B7 (announcing another merger
between two financial giants in the banking industry).
o See John Authers, Travelers, Citicorp merger completes today, FIN. TIMES, Oct.
8, 1998, at 21 (describing the sharp decline in the price of bank shares in late 1998,
which considerably lowered the value of the Citibank-Travelers and the Nations-
Bank-BankAmerica mergers).
" See Jill Dutt & John M. Berry, Citicorp-Travelers Deal to Test Old Regulator
View, WASH. POST, Apr. 7, 1998, at Cl (discussing the proposed Citicorp-
Travelers merger and the effects on the banking and non-bank financial industries);
see also J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Great Fall: The Consequences of Repealing the
Glass-Steagall Act, 2 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 129, 130-31 (1995) (analyzing the
effects of repealing the Glass-Steagall Act and the consequences on mergers be-
tween banks and non-bank related financial institutions); see generally Wolfgang
1. Reinicke, Consolidation of Federal Bank Regulation?, in REFORMING MONEY
AND FINANCE 185-86 (R. Guttmann ed., M.E. Sharpe 1997) (discussing the merits
of reforming the United States banking and finance laws and the potential conse-
quences such reform would have on mergers and acquisitions between finance and
money lending institutions).
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At first glance, there does not appear to be a relationship between
banking and finance in these two neighboring countries. In Mexico,
there is financial retrenchment and a banking industry that struggles
for solvency and survival. 2 By contrast, there is an incredible infla-
tion in the great United States bull market and the expansion of
United States banking and finance into new geographic and product
areas. 3 Mexico, however, opened its banks to foreign ownership at
the same time that the agenda of United States banks was to branch
out into more diverse types of banking and to continue investing in
emerging economies.14 These trends, therefore, indicate the possibil-
ity of a "marriage of convenience,"'" with United States commercial
and investment banking coming to the rescue of the flailing Mexican
banking industry. 6 Hoping to preside over this marriage are a host of
12 See Henry Tricks, Top Mexico Banks Face Capital Need, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 21,
1999, at 4 (reporting on the current Mexican banking crisis and the need for an in-
flux of capital to help strengthen and support the failing banks); see also JAVIER
GAVITO, AARON SILVA, GUILLERMO ZAMARIPPA, Marico's Banking Crisis: Ori-
gins, Consequences, and Countermeasures, in REGULATION AND SUPERVISION OF
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE NAFTA COUNTRIES AND BEYOND 228-45 (G.M.
von Furstenberg, ed., Kluwer Academic Publishers 1997) (offering an analysis of
the causes behind the Mexican banking crisis and the steps that can be taken in the
future to avert or prevent such a crisis); Bancomer of Mexico Braces Itself as It
Heads Into Rough Waters, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 1998, at Al0 (reporting on the
Mexican banking crisis, the reaction of banks like Bancomer, and the steps taken
by these banks to survive the crisis).
" See supra notes 8-11, and accompanying text.
,4 See supra notes 4, 8-9, and accompanying text.
'5See SIDNEY WEINTRAUB, A MARRIAGE OF CONVENIENCE: RELATIONS BETWEEN
MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES (1990) (likening the relations more as a "mixed
marriage" of different cultures); see also Stephen Zamora, The Americanization of
Mexican Law: Non-Trade Issues in the North American Free Trade Agreement, 24
LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUs. 391, 438 (1993) (discussing the effects of the North
American Free Trade Agreement on the domestic laws of Mexico).
'5 See JOHN E. ROGERS & ADRIAN ZUBIKARAI ARRIOLA, Foreign Banks in Mexico:
on the Verge of a New Era?, 7-12 PROGRAM OF THE SEVENTH ANNUAL
CONFERENCE, U.S.-MEXICO LAW INSTITUTE (1998) (analyzing the changes within
the Mexican banking system and the possibility of increased foreign investment
especially by United States banks).
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ministers who seek to broaden the agenda of a particular type of
neoliberal globalization, one marked by increased deregulation, fi-
nancial liberalization and privatization.
17
Such a marriage between United States and Mexican banking and
finance would, of course, create significant legal opportunities. Many
scholarly writings have focused on the legal details of Mexico's bank
bailout and privatization plans, 8 the legal issues involved in the con-
solidation of United States banking, the erosion of the Glass-Steagall
Act,'9 and the minutia of the many private capital market develop-
17 See BEYOND BRE*rON WOODS: ALTERNATIVES TO THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC
ORDER (J. Cavanagh et al. eds., Institute for Policy Studies 1994) (contemplating
changes to the world economic system which would include increased deregula-
tion, financial liberalization, and privatization); see also FIFrY YEARS iS ENOUGH:
THE CASE AGAINST THE WORLD BANK AND THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
FUND (K. Danaher & M. Yunus eds., South End Press 1994) (discussing the bene-
fits and detriments of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund over
the course of the last fifty years and the effects of their actions on the global eco-
nomic system); CHERYL PAYER, THE DEBT TRAP: THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND AND THE THIRD WORLD (1974) (discussing the efforts of poor
nations to gain control over their economies, and the role the IMF played in foiling
any such attempt); James Wilson, Latin America's Minnows Scent Privatisation's
Rewards, FIN. TIMES, June 10, 1998, at 7 (reporting on the effects of privatization
on Latin American countries and their respective economies).
" See ROGERS & ARRIOLA, supra note 16, at 10-11 (discussing the economic and
financial benefits of foreign investment, especially United States investment in the
Mexican banking industry).
"See generally Robert G. Rowe III and Kenneth A. Guenther, The Erosion of the
Glass-Steagall Act and the Bank Holding Company Act, 115 BANKING L.J. 663,
670 (1998) (analyzing the changes to the Glass-Steagall Act as a result of relaxing
standards on mergers between banking and non-bank financial institutions); Note,
The New American Universal Bank, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1310, 1327 (1997) (dis-
cussing the rapid increase in mergers between traditional banks and non-bank fi-
nancial enterprises); Nicole Fradette et al., Regulatory Reform in Transition: The
Dismantling of the Glass-Steagall Act, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 545, 552 (1995) (ana-
lyzing the effects of continued United States banking sector regulation on the
Glass-Steagall Act which prohibits the mergers of banks and non-bank related fi-
nancial service companies); see also GEORGE J. BENSTON, THE SEPARATION OF
COMMERCIAL AND INVESTMENT BANKING: THE GLASS-STEAGALL ACT REVISITED
AND RECONSIDERED 179-214 (1990) (arguing that commercial and investment
banking should continue to be segregated).
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ments and investment opportunities on both sides of the border.'
It is important to step back from the trees and consider the forest;
to step back from the details and consider the broader legal and ex-
tra-legal developments that often provide the unspoken context for
private financial activity. This approach permits an examination of
our most fundamental assumptions about the nature of today's glob-
alization of money and finance. This article will consider the context
of the global currency contagion, which may threaten the profitabil-
ity of private financial institutions,2' the prospects for a marriage
between United States and Mexican banking, and the economic prog-
ress upon which so much of the work of United States-Mexican co-
operation depends."
The currency contagion continues to bring tremendous disloca-
See generally RALPH FOLSOM & W. DAVIS FOLSOM, Understanding NAFTA and
its International Business Implications (1997) (discussing NAFTA in relation to
the effects of international business on the banking and other investment opportu-
nities in both the United States and Mexico); see also HAL S. SCOTT & PHILIP A.
WELLONS, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE; TRANSACTIONS, POLICY, AND REGULATION
768-812 (3d ed., 1996).
21 See Joseph Kahn, Merrill Cites $1.4 Billion Exposure to Long-Term, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct.2, 1998, at C1 (discussing the general financial situation of Merrill-
Lynch and its profitability); see also Tracy Corrigan and Clay Harris, Merrill to
Cut 3,400 Jobs After Sharp Fall in Profits, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1998, at 1 (re-
porting the layoffs at Merrill-Lynch and the correlation between lower profits and
the general welfare of the corporation); Edmund L. Andrews, Market Place: UBS
says it will reduce international lending, as well as risks like investment in dis-
tressed loans, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1999, at C12 (discussing the general effects of
international lending on financial institutions, which causes some institutions to
reduce or to halt such types of investment); John Authers, BankAmerica in S1.4
Billion Provision, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1998, at 1 (describing BankAmerica's in-
vestment strategy and overall profitability).
2 See Sue Major Holmes, Asian Woes Dragged Down N.M., ALBUQUERQUE J.,
Dec. 29, 1998, at C3 (arguing that the fallout from the Asian contagion has already
cost the local economy of New Mexico thousands of jobs); see also Rob Valletta,
East Asia's Impact on Twelfth District Exports, Federal Reserve Bank of San
Francisco, Economic Letter No. 98-35 (Nov. 20, 1998) (stating that the slowdown
in United States manufacturing stems from the Asian recession); Treasury Study
Shows Effects of Global Financial Situation, TREASURY NEWS, (last modified Oct.
6, 1998) <http://wwv.treas.gov/press releasesfpr2739.html>.
1999] 1577
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
tions and hardship to Mexican society.3 For example, very high real
interest rates and cutbacks in the government's fiscal programs have
harmed a wide segment of the Mexican population. Recent financial
market developments also brought fears that Wall Street's bull mar-
ket could itself be threatened by the widening global financial tur-
moil.25 Instead of congratulating ourselves on the opportunity to ex-
ploit this crisis environment, we should focus on the potential
benefits of a more stable financial regime. Such a new regime should
create opportunities for private profit, while also providing the foun-
dation for renewed prosperity for a wider population, rather than
merely the supplicants of high finance.
I. THE CONTEXT OF GLOBAL CONTAGION
A. RECENT STRESSES: BANKS, HEDGE FUNDS, AND DERIVATIVES
The global currency contagion offered a shock to conventional
23 See Anthony DePalma, In Mexico, Hunger for Poor and Middle-Class Hardship,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1995, at I (reporting on the effects of the peso devaluation on
Mexican people and the society); see also Allan H. Meltzer, Clinton's Bailout Was
No Favor to Mexicans, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 1996, at AI I (arguing that the United
States' bailout of Mexico's financial crisis did not benefit the financial markets as
much as anticipated); Julia Preston, Mexicans Rise in a Rate Rebellion, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., Apr. 8, 1996, at 10 (reporting that variable interest rates rose above
100%; nearly 20% of the value of all loans was past due).
24 See WILLIAM GREIDER, ONE WORLD, READY OR NOT 262-63, 267 (1997) (argu-
ing that imposing interest rates on ordinary Mexicans in the hundreds of percent
illustrates that developing countries like Mexico "make a kind of deal with the
devil when they open themselves to the animal spirits of global capital").
25 See Paul Beckett, Banks Latin Exposure Moves to Fore, WALL ST. J., Sept. 10,
1998, at A3 (analyzing the effects of the Latin American crisis on American finan-
cial markets); see also Robert D. Hershey Jr., The Sell-off in Stocks Deepen as
Markets Plunge Worldwide, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1998, at CI (reporting on the in-
creasing number of market sell-offs in response to the global economic crisis);
Paul Volcker, Boost For Banking, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 1998, at A21 (warning
against the combination of United States banking with commerce). Volcker writes
that recent banking crises in Asia and Russia illustrate "the folly of permitting in-
dustrial-financial conglomerates to dominate financial markets and potentially
larger areas of the economy." See id.
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wisdom by striking at United States-based financial institutions with
little warning.2 6 The sudden meltdown and bailout in October 1998 of
a large United States-based hedge fund called Long-Term Capital
Management, L.P.27 exposed many United States banks for lending
millions of dollars to Long-Term Capital, as well as to hundreds of
other hedge funds for highly speculative investments in exotic finan-
cial instruments known as derivatives.8 Regulators are increasingly
concerned that the largest United States banks have significant credit
exposure to derivative trading, particularly to exchange rate con-
tracts, 29 and the Basle Accord's risk-based capital requirements fail to
accurately reflect the risks involved in such derivative trading."'
26 See Peter B. Kenen, From Halifax to Lyons: Whqat Has Been Done About Crisis
Management?, ESSAYS IN INT'L FIN., No. 200 (1996) (analyzing the sudden effects
of the global currency crisis on United States financial institutions and demon-
strafing that the past Summit meetings of the Group of Seven (G-7) leading indus-
trial countries seems like annual rituals of complacency, where western leaders fail
to address the root causes of contagion and focus instead on crisis-management).
27 See Sharon R. King, After Hedge Fund Bailout, Tighter Restrictions Are Seen,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1998, at C5 (reporting that many hedge funds, like Long-
Term Capital Management, are structured as limited partnerships, and are open
only to "sophisticated investors" who must have a net worth of more than S 1 mil-
lion and an annual income of more than S200,000 in each of the most recent two
years).
28See Robert D. Hershey Jr., A Warning To Banks: Scrutinize Hedge Funds, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 17, 1998, at C4 (reporting on the exposure of United States banks to
hedge funds and the detrimental financial and economic effects on the banking in-
dustry); see also Daniel P. Cunningham, et. al., An Introduction to OTC Deriva-
tives, 848 PLI/CoRP 121, 125-27 (1994) (explaining the basic tenets of derivatives
and the economic impact of these investments on the global economy).
29 See Stephen Zamora, Regulating the Global Banking Network: What Role (If
Any) For the IMF?, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 1953, 1956-57 (1994) (reporting that
"by 1992, the aggregate credit exposure of ten United States banks due to deriva-
tive trading had reached $170 billion, or 17.3% of their total assets").
'. See George Graham, Warning on Poor Lending Standards, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 15,
1998, at 8 (arguing that the poor lending practices and investment practices of
banks fail to disclose the risks involved in derivative trading); see also David Bar-
boza & Jeff Gerth, On Regulating Derivatives, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1998, at CI
(reporting on the proposed increases in regulation for investing in derivatives),
Barbara C. Matthews, Capital Adequacy, Netting, and Derivatives, 2 STAN. J. L.
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Although regulators and legal commentators recognize the role of
hedge funds and derivative trading in transmitting financial failure
across markets,3 discussion of such dynamics is often confined to
experts and technocrats." Consequently, the failures of private finan-
cial actors do not receive much blame when financial contagion
strikes." Instead, the focus is on the victim countries, their alleged
failures, and on policies that place the burdens of adjustment on
those victim countries.
The drama surrounding Long-Term Capital Management's mis-
management exposed a need for greater humility. For example, in the
Bus. & FIN. 167, 169-70 (1995) (discussing the risks of investing in derivatives
and the exposure of United States banks, which was discussed at the Basle Com-
mittee meeting in July 1994), Bruce S. Darringer, Swaps, Banks, and Capital: An
Analysis of Swap Risks and a Critical Assessment of the Basle Accord's Treatment
of Swaps, 16 U. PA. INT'L Bus. L. 259 (1995) (offering an analysis of the terms
and provisions of the Basle Accord and the risks involved with disclosure require-
ments of the treaty).
"' See Charles A. Samuelson, Note, The Fall of Barings: Lessons for Legal Over-
sight ofDerivatives Transactions in the United States, 29 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 767,
768-69 (1996) (discussing the demise of Barings Bank and the lessons learned by
American banks regarding the need for legal oversight in derivatives trading); see
also J. Christopher Kojima, Product-Based Solutions to Financial Innovation: The
Promise and Danger of Applying Federal Securities Laws to OTC Derivatives, 33
AM. Bus. L. J. 259, 261 (1995); Nancy Worth, Harmonizing Capital Adequacy
Rules for International Banks and Securities Firms, 18 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM.
REG. 133, 134-35 (1992) (discussing the need for coordination among international
banks and securities firms in developing and administering rules and regulations
for hedge funds and derivative markets).
32 See Samuelson, supra note 31, at 773-75 (arguing that regulators and legal ex-
perts do not analyze the full effects of derivatives, but rather, only a limited num-
ber of experts dominate the field).
See Ovidio E. Diaz Espino, Emerging Markets Derivatives Set To Expand, 1017
PLI/CoRP 669, 671 (1997) (arguing that derivatives are a solution, rather than a
problem, for the investment needs of emerging markets).
" See Jeffrey D. Sachs, The Wrong Medicine for Asia, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1998,
at A19. (stating that "the currency crisis is not the result of Asian government
profligacy... [t]his is a crisis made mainly in the private, albeit under-regulated, fi-
nancial markets").
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past several years the United States preached to the rest of the world
about the dangers of crony capitalism, the dangers of not moving fast
enough to close down insolvent banks, and the need for transparen-
cy.35 Suddenly, however, this flagrant wake-up call arose, presenting
a reminder that the United States is not immune to such folly and
crass self-interest.
3 6
There are several challenging and frightening aspects of the recent
turmoil in financial markets. First, is the unpredictability of the onset
of financial panic in any particular market. Little more than an un-
substantiated rumor, a disappointing report about earnings or foreign
reserves, or even a bearish editorial, triggers a sudden turn in herd
mentality to panic selling.37 Second, is the manner in which financial
failures in one market are so quickly transmitted around the globe




There are many damning facts that should not be forgotten now
that a sense of calm has replaced the panic of the fall in 1998. To be-
31 See BRUCE COGGINS, Does Financial Deregulation Work? A Critique of Free
Market Approaches 11-30 (1998) (describing the deregulationist program and as-
sumptions).
36 See Richard Stevenson, Fiscal Stones, Glass Houses: Bailout Points Finger Back
Toward the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1998, at AI (critiquing the United States
for adopting an artificial sense of self-importance prior to falling victim to the ef-
fects of the collapse of the Long-Term Capital Management hedge fund and the
effects on the United States banking industry).
37 See Soros Urges Russia to Devalue Ruble, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1998, at 1 (dis-
cussing how, for instance, the market turned increasingly against the Russian ruble
upon publication of a letter in Th7e Financial Times by speculator George Soros
predicting the ruble's devaluation); see also Russian to the Exits: 'A4 Global Mar-
gin Call' Rocks Markets, Banks, and Borris Yeltsin, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 1998, at
Al (reporting the effects of a statement in the global press on the margins of the
Russian economy).
31 See Gretchen Morgenson, Hedge Fund Bailout Rattles Investors and Markets,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1998, at Al (reporting that hedge funds burned in Russia's
meltdown needed to cover open positions by selling United States Treasuries and
corporate debt, thereby putting downward pressure on those markets, which un-
dermined the positions of other hedge funds).
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gin with, Long-Term Capital Management, a hedge fund with about
$2.3 billion in capitalization, leveraged hundreds of billions of dol-
lars in loans from some of the world's largest private financial insti-
tutions, thereby increasing its own exposure to one of systematic
proportions. Secondly, the fact that Myron Scholes and Robert
Merton, two Nobel laureates in economics, who until recently were
hailed as financial geniuses, directed this hedge fund.40 Thirdly, the
fact that the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, rather than permit
the meltdown of an obviously insolvent Long-Term Capital Man-
agement hedge fund and risk widening the financial crisis, used its
offices to broker a $3.65 billion bailout of that hedge fund.4'
These events suggest that the United States is not immune from
the evils and weaknesses that we deplore in others. Such evils and
weaknesses include: a frightening lack of financial transparency;
41
9 See Floyd Norris, Risking Everything on One Big Gambler, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1,
1998, at A30 (analyzing the actions of the Long-Term Capital Management hedge
fund and the effects of risk exposure on such funds).
"' See Peter Truell, An Alchemist Who Turned Gold Into Lead, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
25, 1998, at C1 (reporting on the skills of Myron Scholes and Robert Merton); Jon
Krainer, The 1997 Nobel Prize in Economics, Federal Reserve Bank of San Fran-
cisco Letter, No. 98-05 (Feb. 13, 1998) (discussing the skills of Myron Scholes and
Robert Merton and their findings, which earned them the Nobel Prize in Econom-
ics); see also JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH: 1929 58-61, 120,
129-30, (1954) (warning that financial genius is always before the fall).
4' See Gretchen Morgenson, Seeing a Fund as Too Big to Fail, New York Fed As-
sists Its Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1998, at Al (explaining the Federal Re-
serve-brokered, private sector bailout of the fledgling hedge fund); see also Richa-
rd W. Stevenson, Fed Chief Defends U.S. Role in Saving Giant Hedge Fund, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 2, 1998, at Al (offering alternative insight into the bailout of the
Long-Term Capital Management hedge fund); Truell, supra note 40, and accom-
panying text.
42 See Melody Petersen, Trick: Accounting Draws Levitt Criticism, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 29, 1998, at C8 (quoting Arthur Levitt, chairman of the United States Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission who harshly criticized the use of "accounting ho-
cus-pocus" to manipulate earnings numbers reported to shareholders); see also
Melody Petersen, U.N. Report Faults Big Accountants in Asia Crisis, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct, 24, 1998, at B I (reporting that the U.N. faulted large accounting firms and ac-
countants in mismanaging finances which led to the current economic crisis in
Asia).
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hesitation in closing down insolvent financial institutions; failure to
know when to maintain these risks from wider financial and eco-
nomic carnage; and the so-called "crony capitalism" tendency of os-
tensible public-sector regulatory authorities reaching out to help their
"friends" in the private sector. 4' The revelation that among Long-
Term Capital Management's partners was David W. Mullins, Jr., a
former vice chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, is particularly
embarrassing."4 The class-biased cronyism of the Federal Reserve,
however, goes much further.4 1 In mid-October 1998, the Federal Re-
serve's Open Market Committee convened a special emergency
meeting, by conference call, to lower short-term interest rates." This
was motivated in no small part by a desire to assist not just Long-
Term Capital Management, but other hedge funds as well to unwind
their exposed positions in the government and private sector bond
markets.
Long-Term Capital Management should provide a glaring re-
41 See John Plender, Western Crony Capitalism, FIN. TIMEs. Oct. 3, 1998, at 10
(criticizing the incestuous relationship between government and regulatory offi-
cials and their private sector contacts).
44 See Stevenson, supra note 41, and accompanying text; see also Truell, supra
note 40, and accompanying text.
41 See Canova, supra note 7, at 1335 (arguing that the Federal Reserve provided
large interest rate spreads as a hidden subsidy to bailout commercial banks).
" See Richard W. Stevenson, Fed Was Worried About Misinterpretation, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 20, 1998, at C5 (reporting that no formal vote was taken of members
of the Federal Reserve's Open Market Committee; the interest rate cut was made
under Chairman Greenspan's authority). Minutes of the Federal Reserve's October
15'b meeting stated that lowering interest rates would more likely help to settle
volatile financial markets and cushion the effects of more restrictive financial con-
ditions. See id.
41 See Bill Barnhart, Fed Steps In, Stocks Take Qff While Many Applaud Cut is for
the Few, CHI. TRIB., Oct.16, 1998, at 1 (stating that "the Fed hopes to stimulate
enough bidders for risky assets to enable hedge funds and other highly leveraged
speculators to sell their positions with the least shock waves possible"); see also
Richard W. Stevenson, Federal Reserne Cuts Rates Again; Wall St. Surges, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 16, 1998, at Al (discussing the correlation between the Federal Re-
serve's actions regarding interest rates and the effect on the financial markets).
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minder that no country, not even the United States, is immune from
financial contagion, global market downtrends, or the human pro-
clivity to hide the truth and help one's cronies. It also suggests the
need for greater humility when our so-called "experts" at the Inter-
national Monetary Fund ("IMF") and the United States Treasury De-
partment dispense advice and dictate to others, often as preconditions
to badly-needed financial assistance.48
For those who remain unconvinced of such insight, pecuniary con-
cerns stemming from the meltdown and bailout of Long-Term Capi-
tal Management may prove persuasive. The losses incurred by many
leading United States private commercial and investment banks be-
cause of their reckless lending to this hedge fund, likely will hamper
their willingness and ability to increase or even maintain present lev-
els of investment in emerging market economies, including the
Mexican banking and financial sector.49 Therefore, Long-Term
Capital's mismanagement, and the specter of other financial losses
from banking and hedge fund losses in derivative markets, may di-
minish the likelihood of a United States investor-led rescue of the
Mexican banking and finance industries.
B. ORIGINS OF CONTAGION: CAPITAL ACCOUNT LIBERALIZATION
AND THE HOT MONEY PROBLEM
The currency contagion once again brought trouble to the Mexican
economy. Recently, in the aftermath of the Russian economic col-
lapse, the Mexican peso declined by almost 20% as capital fled from
" See Mark Landler, U.S. Hedge Fund Bailout Raises Asian Eyebrows, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 29, 1998, at C8 (discussing the $3.65 billion rescue by United States
financial institutions of Long-Term Capital Management amidst the economic
turmoil in Asia); see also Nicholas D. Kristof, Japan Sees Itself as Scapegoat of
Washington in Asia Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1998, at Al (revealing the Japa-
nese view that the United States is partly to blame for the Asian downturn); see
generally Joseph Stiglitz, More Instruments and Broader Goals: Moving Toward
the Post-Washington Consensus, The 1998 WIDER Annual Lecture, Helsinki,
Finland, Jan. 7, 1998 (reprinted at http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/extme/
js010798/wider.htm) (the World Bank chief economist criticizing Washington
consensus policies, and urging "a greater degree of humility").
49 See GREIDER, supra note 24 at 262-63, 267 (citing high interest rates in the
Mexican economy).
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most emerging markets. 0 As a result, the Mexican government raised
interest rates above 40% to appease the international currency mar-
kets." These high interest rates, when combined with plunging oil
revenues and falling domestic demand,'2 likely will increase future
trade and budget deficits, and continued dependence on foreign
capital.
Mexico's recent difficulties should not come as much of a sur-
prise. The very origins of today's currency contagion can be traced to
the 1994-95 currency panic that damaged the Mexican peso. By
1994, Mexico had come to rely heavily on short-term portfolio capi-
tal inflows, also referred to as "hot money." During this time, for-
eigners bought approximately 40% of the Mexican treasury notes
and held securities accounting for 30% of Mexico's stock market."'
Foreign portfolio investment in Mexico increased from an annual av-
erage of about $5 billion for the period from 1986-1990 to $67 bil-
lion in 1993.-" Between 1989 and 1993, Latin America captured
nearly 66% of the short-term portfolio investment flows into emerg-
ing markets, and the Mexican stock market rose during that same pe-
riod by 436% in dollar terms.5 As the peso crisis subsequently dem-
See Sam Dillon, Mexican Prices Feel the Squeeze of World Economic Trouble,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1998, at C4 (evidencing economic difficulties in the Mexi-
can economy).
"1 See id.
52 See id.; see also Paul Solman & Robert Corzine, Ongoing Slide in Global Oil
Prices Pressures Overall Commodity Prices, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1998, at 21
(noting that global oil prices hit a twelve-year low, falling below S10 a barrel).
13 See Enrique R. Carrasco & Randall Thomas, Encouraging Relational Investment
and Controlling Portfolio Investment in Developing Countries in the Aftermath of
the Mexican Financial Crisis, 34 COLU I. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 539, 572-73 (1996)
(arguing that Mexico depended on foreign investment more than any other emerg-
ing nation in 1994 and, as such, foreigners possessed significant control over eco-
nomic policy).
See id. at 557 (evidencing the increase in foreign investment in Latin America as
a result of economic reforms and high interest rates).
'5 See id. at 557, 560 (arguing that heavy portfolio investment made Mexico de-
pendent on external sources).
1999l 1585
AM. U. INT'L L. REv.
onstrated, a country that does not protect itself against short-term hot
money inflows is susceptible to market hysteria and thus an eco-
nomic outflow. After all, what is an outflow problem? It is when eve-
ryone starts heading to the door simply because everyone else is
heading to the door. 6 There is not necessarily a rational reason to ex-
plain the panic. The Mexican economy seemingly sustained itself on
such short-term capital inflows and consequently suffered greatly
when those inflows turned suddenly to outflows as a result of
changes in mass-market psychology. 7
II. NAFTA'S MASK OF NEOLIBERAL DISCOURSES
In the aftermath of the 1995 peso collapse, an ongoing debate con-
cerning the relative merits of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) and the $51 billion international bailout pack-
age for Mexico persists." The United States and Mexican govern-
ments prefer to characterize both as great success stories. Mexico re-
paid the emergency bailout loans with interest," and some studies
56 See Walter Russell Mead, Rule 1: Don't Panic. Rule 2: Panic First, 130
ESQUIRE, Oct. 1998, at 92, 94-96 (arguing that because economic turmoil has
spread throughout Asia and South America so quickly, it may even spread to the
United States).
5' See Ricardo Ffrench-Davis, Policy Implications of the Tequila Effect,
CHALLENGE, Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 15 (discussing the history of capital flows to Latin
America and lessons to be learned from financial crises).
" See Carrasco & Thomas, supra note 53, at 568 (explaining that Mexico also
agreed to put the proceeds from its oil sales through an escrow account with the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York as collateral for the United States loan); see
also SIDNEY WEINTRAUB, NAFTA AT THREE 63 (1997); see generally Russell
Dean Covey, Note, Adventures in the Zone of Twilight: Separation of Powers and
National Economic Security in the Mexican Bailout, 105 YALE L. J. 1311 (1996)
(discussing the debate as to whether President Clinton had the authority to extend
the aid package to Mexico). The bailout consisted of contributions from the IMF
($18 billion), the Bank for International Settlements ($10 billion), foreign com-
mercial banks ($3 billion), and the United States Treasury's Exchange Stabiliza-
tion Fund ($20 billion).
59 See David Hale, Such a Deal: The Much-Maligned Mexico Bailout is Looking
Smart, and Not Just for Mexico, WASH. POST, June 2, 1996, at C4 (arguing that
the bailout cushioned foreign investors from the discipline of the market).
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suggest that since NAFTA's implementation, a surge in foreign di-
rect investment from the United States to Mexico resulted in the
creation of some 600,000 jobs in Mexico. ' We should, however,
consider a wider range of criteria when assessing the results of the
NAFTA regime of free capital mobility and the peso collapse and
bailout. For instance, a more convincing narrative holds that
NAFTA's liberalization of capital flows and the subsequent peso
crash and economic austerity contributed to steep declines in jobs
and real incomes for millions of Mexicans,' as well as to the recent
upsurge of illegal immigration from Mexico to the United States.'2
While NAFTA arguably bolstered Mexican exports and job crea-
tion in the maquiladoras at the border, NAFTA also required that
Mexico substantially liberalize its capital accounts by removing all
restrictions on the inflow and outflow of capital." NAFTA Article
1109 requires that each Member country "permit all transfers relating
to an investment. ' '64 Contrary to the focus of some commentators,'
60 See Eusebio Francisco Flores Barraza, Foreign Exchange Challenges vis-dt-vis
NAFTA, Five Years After NAFTA Came into Force, U.S.-Mexico Judicial Ex-
change Border Conference, Mar. 19, 1999; see also Paul Krugman, The Uncom-
fortable Truth about NAFTA, 72 FOREIGN AFF. 13, 14-16 (1993) (prior to the
peso collapse, Krugman did no foresee the substantial depressing effects on
Mexican jobs and real income and ensuing economic austerity).
6' See FOLKERTS-LANDAU & ITO, supra note 2, at 125-27; see also WEINTRAUB,
supra note 58, at 54-68 (acknowledging that NAFTA liberalized capital inflows,
yet disclaiming NAFTA responsibility for adverse consequences that followed);
FOLSOM & FOLSOM, supra note 20, at 307-08.
Q See David E. Sanger, Mexico Crisis Seen Spurring Flow oblfAiens, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 18, 1995, at A3; see also ROBERT APONTE, The Effects of NAFT4 on Mexico-
United States Imigration, in POLICY CHOICES: FREE TRADE AMONG NAFTA
NATIONS 195-216 (Karen Robert & Mark I. Wilson eds., Michigan State Univer-
sity Press 1996) (discussing the jobs and immigration debates); SASKtA SASSEN,
THE MOBILITY OF LABOR AND CAPITAL 120 (1988).
6'3 See North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex.,
chs. 11, 14, 32 I.L.M. 296 [hereinafter NAFTA].
64 See id. at art. 1109 (stating that payment of the investment, profits, dividends,
interest, capital gains, and other fees are to be made in a freely usable currency at
the market rate of exchange).
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NAFTA's capital liberalization provisions are not confined to foreign
direct investment ("FDI"), which usually refers to foreign investment
in fixed plants and equipment.66 Rather, the NAFTA liberalization
provisions also apply to many types of so-called hot money invest-
ments, such as foreign portfolio investment in stocks and bonds.67
Accordingly, this process of financial liberalization left Mexico
highly dependent on such hot money inflows.68
Finally, Chapter 14 of NAFTA provides for a gradual tolerance
for, and liberalization of, foreign ownership of financial institutions
and services. 69 As a result, a significant increase in the operation of
65 See, e.g., Gloria L. Sandrino, The NAFTA Investment Chapter and Foreign Di-
rect Investment in Mexico: A Third World Perspective, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 259, 264-65 (1994); see also Jose E. Alvarez, Critical Theory and the North
American Free Trade Agreement's Chapter Eleven, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L.
REv. 303, 306-07 (1997); Guillermo Emiliano Del Toro, Foreign Direct Invest-
ment in Mexico and the 1994 Crisis: A Legal Perspective, 20 HOUs. J. INT'L L. 1,
5-7 (1997). These authors were either unaware of the distinction between foreign
direct investment ("FDI") and portfolio capital, intended for the term FDI to in-
clude portfolio capital flows, or were writing before the significance of such hot
money flows was apparent.
66 See PETER MOLES & NICHOLAS TERRY, THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL TERMS 232, 235 (1997) (asserting that foreign direct investment is
usually by multinational corporations involving purchase of physical assets in an-
other country, whereas portfolio investment involves purchase of financial in-
struments such as common stocks or bonds).
67 See NAFTA, supra note 63, at art. 1139 (defining investments as including eq-
uity securities, interests in an enterprise that entitles owner to share of income or
profits, loans to affiliates, and debt securities where the original maturity is at
least three years). Even financial instruments that are not considered short-term
(such as equities or debt securities with long maturities) can be sold instantly, and
are, therefore, vulnerable to shifts in market sentiment. See Bank for International
Settlements: 68M Annual Report, 1997-98 Ann. Rep. at 129.
68 See WEINTRAUB, supra note 58, at 55 (noting that while not expressly required
by NAFTA, the Mexican government came to rely on capital inflows in the form
of foreign investment in tesobonos (short-term government debt)). This step was
necessary to finance deficits that were made inevitable by NAFTA liberalization
of trade in capital goods. See FOLSOM & FOLSOM, supra note 20, at 299.
69 See NAFTA, supra note 63, at ch. 14 (providing for rights of establishment of
financial institutions, most-favored-nation, and national treatment; annex VII (B)
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foreign financial institutions in Mexico 0 contributed to the dramatic
surge of hot money inflows into Mexico.7'
NAFTA's liberalization provisions, central to the Mexican gov-
ernment's neoliberal agenda, led directly to the eventual run on the
peso.7 Capital account liberalization set the stage and provided the
mechanism for such capital flight.3 Consequently, the peso crisis
forced Mexico to adopt economic austerity measures as a condition
for IMF financial assistance. 7 These measures include strict fiscal
and monetary austerity policies that have translated into extremely
sets forth Mexico's reservations, commitments, and timetables with respect to
establishment and operation of foreign-owned financial institutions in Mexico).
70 See ROGERS & ARRIOLA, supra note 16, at 6 (noting that Mexico amended its
Credit Institutions Law to give effect to Annex VII(B) and by mid-1998 at least
seventeen subsidiaries of foreign banks were operating in Mexico).
71 See FOLKERTS-LANDAU & ITO, supra note 2, at 53-55. The restructuring of
Mexico's debt from bank loans to "Brady bonds" may also have contributed to
the peso crisis of 1995 by increasing the short-term nature of its exposure. See id.
at 64 (describing the steep fall in Mexican Brady bonds in the first quarter of
1995); see also FOLSOM, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 947-
48 (1995) (detailing the nature of the Brady Bond).
72 See FOLKERTS-LANDAU & ITO, supra note 2, at 101-102 (noting that even prior
to NAFTA's liberalization of capital flows, the Mexican government had started
the process by lifting restrictions on inflows in April 1992 and outflows in No-
vember 1991). 1990 was the first year of Mexico's surge in inflows and outflows.
See id.
See supra notes 52-56, 63-70 and accompanying text (discussing the liberaliza-
tion process and the subsequent increase in hot money inflows).
74 See Canasco & Thomas, supra note 53, at 565-71 (describing Mexico's reform
measures, including privatization programs, freezing wages and prices, liberaliz-
ing the foreign investment regime, and decreasing spending, and how these meas-
ures affected Mexican citizens); see generally Letter of Intent from Guillermo
Ortiz Martinez, Secretary of Finance and Public Credit of Mexico, and Miguel
Mancera Aguayo, Governor of the Bank of Mexico, to Michel Camdessus, Man-
aging Director of the International Monetary Fund (Jan. 26, 1995) (outlining the
Mexican plans of action to deal with the financial crisis).
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high real interest rates." When combined with the steep drop in the
value of the peso in early 1995, the result has been an escalation in
inflation and interest rates and a steep decline in living standards for
millions of Mexicans.76 The free market model has resulted in the
loss of far more jobs within the interior of Mexico than have been
gained in the bustling maquiladoras along the border." The dominant
narratives of NAFTA, however, focus exclusively on maquiladora
job gains, to the exclusion of the greater economic austerity job
losses."
While the relationship between NAFTA's capital liberalization
and Mexico's subsequent economic austerity is widely recognized by
policy makers and analysts, Mexican economic reality is largely
masked by other more dominant discourses that explain the country's
economic and financial problems in terms that serve elite financial
interests. These dominant discourses about development and neolib-
eral economic reform "blame the victim," and promote United States
free market cultural values. At the same time, these discourses mask
the very real political and structural limitations in transplanting
75 See FOLKERTs-LANDAU & ITO, supra note 2, at 63; WEINTRAUB, supra note 58,
at 65. Even after the peso collapse, the Mexican government decided to permit
futures trading of the peso on the Chicago Board of Trade. See United States
Commodities Futures Trading Commission, The CFTC: An Active Partner in
Global Cooperation Through Bilateral and Multinational Enforcement and
Regulatory Memoranda of Understanding (visited June 12, 1999)
<http:\\www.cftc.gov/opa/backgrounder/mou.html>.
76 See Carrasco & Thomas, supra note 53, at 569-71 (noting that Mexico's GDP
fell 7% in 1995 and that great social dissatisfaction has since resulted from higher
unemployment, reduced benefits, and a heightened foreign presence); see also
The Evolution of Industrial Earnings Inequality in Mexico and Brazil, University
of Texas Inequality Project, Working Paper No. 5, (visited July 6, 1999)
<http://utip.gov.utexas.edu/web/atip.htm>.
7 See U.N. Dept. of Econ. & Soc. Info. & Pol'y Analysis, World Economic and
Social Survey, 1997, at 34-35, U.N. Doc. St/ESA/256, U.N. Sales No. E/1997/50
(1997) (discussing the persistent high unemployment and poverty rates in Mex-
ico). JAIME SUCHLICKI, MEXICO: FROM MONTEZUMA TO NAFTA, CHIAPAS, AND
BEYOND 167, 194 (1996); see also World Employment Report 1998-99, at 21
(International Labour Organization, Geneva, 1998).
78 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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United States legal institutions to Mexico and other developing
countries. 79 For instance, there are consistent assertions that Mexico's
secured transactions and bankruptcy laws are not just deficient, but
pre-modern, archaic, and backward.0 These same voices contend that
Mexico's economic development will remain retarded as long as the
Mexican government fails to adopt protections for creditors modeled
after the United States Uniform Commercial Code.81
This discourse is propagated by elite corporate groups within the
United States 2 that have vested interests in altering particular aspects
71 See Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Human Rights in International Economic Law: Lo-
cating Latinas/os in the Linkage Debates, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 361,
377-85 (1997).
so See Boris Kozolchyk, What To Do About Mexico's Antiquated Secured Fi-
nancing Law, (National Law Center for Inter-American Free Trade, 1998) avail-
able in <http://www.natlaw.com/pubs.htm>; see also Mike Lubrano, Practical
Difficulties in Mexican Workouts and Bankruptcy, NORTH AMERICAN
CORPORATE LAWYER, Vol. III (1996); Alejandro Garro, Security Interests in Per-
sonal Property in Latin America: A Comparison With Article 9 and a Model For
Reform, 9 Hous. J. INT'L L. 157 (1987); Franklin Gill, Remarks to the Commerce
and Trade Workshop of the U.S. Mexico Judicial Erchange Border Conference,
Mar. 19-20, 1999.
" See Gill, supra note 80 and accompanying text; Boris Kozolchyk, The Basis for
Proposed Legislation to Modernize Secured Financing in Mexico, 5 U.S.-MEX.
L.J. 43, 52 (1997) (arguing that the modernization of Mexico's secured transac-
tions laws will attract significant global attention); see also John E. Rogers &
Carlos de la Garza-Santos, General Goods: A Case Involving Security Interests in
Inventomy and Accounts in the United States, Canada and MeNxico, 5 U.S.-MEX.
L.J. 3, 8-9 (1997) (arguing that Mexico's secured transactions laws are more
complicated than those of the United States or Canada); see generally John M.
Wilson-Molina, Mexico's Current Secured Financing System: The Law, the Reg-
istries and the Need for Reform, (visited June 13, 1999)
<http://www.natlaw.com/pubs/spmxbk3.htm> (arguing that the Mexican secured
transactions regime is insecure as compared to the United States and Canadian
systems).
2 For instance, the National Law Center for Inter-American Free Trade is well-
funded by elite United States banking, finance, and corporate contributions. At
the top of its agenda is reform of Mexico's secured financing and bankruptcy
laws. See National Law Center for Inter-American Free Trade, Secured Financing
(visited June 13, 1999) <http://Nvwv.natlaw.com/secfin.htm> (providing informa-
tion about membership, corporate backing, and its secured financing and other
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of Mexico's legal system," while maintaining other aspects that
brought significant damage to Mexico's economic development.84 A
very ethnocentric mind-set permeates such discourse, which con-
veniently overlooks the flaws in the United States legal system and
in United States bankruptcy law.86 Additionally, there is no empirical
support for the dramatic assertion that Mexico's commercial code is
the primary and direct cause of the country's economic plight.
Moreover, dominant development discourses tend to overstate the
deficiencies in Mexican law. Contrary to the dominant narratives,
Mexican law provides significant protection for creditors, including
provisions for speedy attachment of assets. 7 Recent Mexican Su-
projects). Noticeably absent from its agenda are any proposals to address Mex-
ico's vulnerability to the hot money problem and its continuing economic auster-
ity. See id.; see also Todd Nelson, Secured Financing Project (visited June 13,
1999) <http://www.natlaw.com/pubs/sfproj.htm>.
"' See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text (suggesting that much of the
agenda of those propagating the dominant development narratives is to provide
additional protections to creditors).
84 See infra notes 169-183, 187-189 and accompanying text (among the most ig-
nored dynamics has been those relating to capital account liberalization).
N5 See generally George A. Akerlof & Paul M. Romer, Looting: The Economic
Underworld of Bankruptcy for Profit, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC
ACTIVITY 1, 1-5 (1993) (describing various financial crises in the United States);
see also Floyd Norris, The Rise of Phony Corporate Tax Shelters, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 8, 1999, at A26 (explaining the various loopholes in the United States tax re-
gime).
86 See Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping and Bankruptcy: A
Reply to Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 815, 833-34 (1987) (noting disagreement
with the Warren Court's views on bankruptcy protections, which leave many un-
protected); see also Morris G. Shanker, The Abuse and Use of Federal Bank-
ruptcy Power, 26 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 3 (1976); Saul Hansell, Battle Emerging
On How To Revise Bankruptcy Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1997, at I; Katharine
Q. Seelye, Senate Votes to Curb Bankruptcy Abuse by Consumers, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 24, 1998, at Al.
"See Lic. Guadalupe Von Ontiveros, Lic. Raquel Nieblas German, & Lic. Martin
Antonio Lugo Romero, Remarks to the Commerce and Trade Workshop of the
U.S.-Mexico Judicial Exchange Border Conference, Mar. 19-20, 1999 (reporting
comments by three Mexican state court judges); Codigo de Comercio de Mexico,
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preme Court decisions reject debtors' defenses and claims that
sharply escalating interest rates are unconscionable and constitute
usury or excessive enrichment of creditors." Despite differences
between the Mexican civil law system and the United States common
law system, there are also significant similarities between United
States and Mexican commercial law.9 The dominant development
discourse, however, continues to ignore both the many deficiencies
in the United States legal system and the significant protection for
creditors found in Mexican law. For such reasons, combined with the
overriding private profit objectives of their proponents, some of these
dominant discourses are neocolonial in nature and resemble a type of
legal imperialism.
It is particularly distorting to assert with such condescending
authority that Mexico's well-developed commercial law impedes
economic development90 when it is the implementation of neoliberal
policy that saddled the Mexican population with crippling interest
rates that are as high as 100% or more.9' In the context of such finan-
Titulo III de los Juicios Ejecutivos, Articulos 1391, 1392, 1394, 1396, 1399
(summary procedures under the Commercial Code of Mexico for attachment
and/or seizure of assets based on specific documentary evidence).
s See supra note 87; see also Julia Preston, Meico Gets Green Light to Charge
Interest on Interest, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1998, at C2 (describing a Mexican Su-
preme Court ruling that allowed ailing Mexican banks to charge interest on inter-
est).
9 See supra notes 87-88. Likewise, the advent of limited liability in the United
States was once criticized as inefficient because it transferred business risks to
creditors. See generally Paul Halpern, Michael Trebilcock, & Stuart Turnbull, An
Economic Analysis of Limited Liability Corporation Lau, 30 U. TORONTO L.J.
117 (1980). More recent scholars claim the opposite, namely that limited liability
is a necessary precondition to capital accumulation, but the empirical evidence on
such a fundamental question regarding the relationship of corporation law and
economic growth is inconclusive. See Phillip I. Blumberg, Limited Liabiliy and
Corporate Groups, 11 J. CORP. L. 573, 575-77 (1986).
90 See Transnational Insolvency Project: International Statement of Mexican
Bankruptcy Law 14-16 ( The American Law Institute ed., 1998) (giving a gener-
ally positive assessment of Mexican bankruptcy law).
91 See GREIDER, supra note 24, at 267.
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cial conditions, even the most comprehensive legal protections for
creditors will not suffice. One cannot draw blood from a stone; and
creditors cannot easily stay solvent by trying to collect on debts and
attach assets in an economic environment in which jobs are disap-
pearing and real incomes are falling, no matter what the legal protec-
tions. 9'
Most importantly, the dominant discourse that criticizes Mexican
commercial culture also tends to subordinate other perspectives that
are more critical of the United States neoliberal model. 93 The domi-
nant narratives mask and distort more comprehensive descriptions of
reality, including narratives that link capital account liberalization toS 94
the hot money problem and currency contagion. Critical perspec-
tives are often marginalized as unrealistic, and dismissed because of
the attenuated chain of causation of their analyses." Liberalized
92 See GALBRAITH, supra note 40, at 184.
9' See Charles R. P. Pouncy, Contemporary Financial Innovation: Orthodoxy and
Alternatives, 51 SMU L. REV. 505, 556-74 (1998) (noting that the dominant nar-
ratives often serve to marginalize heterodox post-Keynesian theories that are
based on more realistic assumptions). Professor Pouncy illustrated how the un-
derlying, but flawed assumptions of neoclassical economic thought prevent legal
scholars from generating a complete understanding of the process of financial in-
novation. See id., Ilene Grabel, Speculation-led Economic Development: A Post-
Keynesian Interpretation of Financial Liberalization Programmes in the Third
World, 9 INT'L REV. APPLIED Eco. 127 (1995); see generally Ilene Grabel, Mar-
keting the Third World: The Contradictions Of Portfolio Investment in the Global
Economy, 24:11 World Development 1761-76 (Nov. 1996).
9' See generally STUART CORBRIDGE, DEBT AND DEVELOPMENT (1993) (suggest-
ing dominant narrative interpretations of the third world debt crisis often reflect
normative and flawed assumptions about development and global economic
structures); see also LARRY ALAN BEAR & RITA MALDONADO-BEAR, FREE
MARKETS, FINANCE, ETHICS, AND LAW (1994); see generally Ilene Grabel, Re-
jecting Exceptionalism: Reinterpreting the Asian Financial Crises, GLOBAL
INSTABILITY AND WORLD ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE 37-67 (1999).
9' Similarly, private legal challenges to the Federal Reserve System have been
dismissed for lack of standing because the plaintiffs could not convince the courts
that the Federal Reserve's open market operations are causally connected to rising
interest rates on private loans and to slower economic growth. See Committee for
M'onetary Reform v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 766 F.2d 538, 542
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing either on the theory of
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capital flows contribute to an overvalued peso, which leads to grow-
ing trade deficits. Growing trade deficits, in turn, lead to an eventual
sudden outflow of capital and downward pressure on the peso. As a
result, the Bank of Mexico engages in foreign exchange market in-
terventions and raises interest rates to stabilize the peso. In the end,
the sharply higher interest rates translate into massive job losses, de-
clining incomes, rising bankruptcies, and financial failures."' Such a
sophisticated analysis is empirically verifiable. The attenuated causal
links in the analysis, however, cannot easily compete with the sim-
plistic appeal of the neoliberal and development discourses that free
markets always work best and that submerging economies are to
blame for their own plight.
97
The connections between Mexico's economic austerity and social
stresses are apparent. The rich live very well in Mexico City, but
they live in gilded cages, often afraid to walk the streets of their own
city by day or night. This is not out of fear of mere robbery, but fear
of kidnapping. The wave of kidnappings sweeping the Mexican
capital is not politically motivated in the strict sense, but economi-
economic harm, or as a challenge on separation-of-powers grounds); see also
Byan v. Fed. Open Market Comm., 235 F. Supp. 877, 881-82 (D. Mont. 1964)
(holding that the plaintiff did not claim any injury to himself apart from that suf-
fered by all other owners of government obligations, and therefore plaintiff had
no standing to sue); Mark F. Bernstein, Note, The Federal Open Market Con-
mittee and the Sharing of Governmental Power With Private Citizens, 75 VA. L.
REV. 111, 131-134 (1989) (examining the issue of standing with regards to the
Federal Reserve System).
" See Stephen Zamora, International Debt: How can Developing Countries Re-
gain Creditworthiness?, 83 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 87, 100-105 (1989) (sug-
gesting that capital flight is believed to have contributed significantly to capital
account imbalances). Establishment economists often acknowledge the same
events, but reach different conclusions about causation. See Michael Mussa &
Morris Goldstein, Symposium, The Integration of World Capital Markets, in
CHANGING CAPITAL MARKETS: IMPLICATIONS FOR MONETARY POLICY 292 (Fed.
Reserve Bank of Kan. City, 1993).
9' See generally ROBERT HEILBRONER & WILLIAM MILBERG, THE CRISIS OF
VISION IN MODERN ECONOMIC THOUGHT (1995) (providing an overview of clas-
sical and modem economic thought); DONALD M. MCCLOSKEY, KNOWLEDGE
AND PERSUASION IN ECONOMICS (1994); DONALD M. MCCLOSKEY, THE
RHETORIC OF ECONOMICS (1985).
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cally motivated.98 Some of the ransoms are as little as $100 or less.
This disturbing social disintegration99 is exacerbated by continuing
stagnation in real wages and incomes, greater stratification in wealth
and income, and persistently high levels of joblessness, underem-
ployment, and poverty.'00
The Mexican government's solutions and the advice of the IMF
continue to impose a dismal austerity of fiscal retrenchment, cut-
backs in public subsidies, and frighteningly high interest rates that
greatly undermine private sector activity.'0 ' This, again, suggests the
need for greater humility and a reexamination of whether NAFTA's
liberalization of short-term portfolio investment, the Mexican peso
bailout, and the IMF austerity program actually represent such great
success stories.
9 See Mary Sutter, Crime Wave Continues to Grip Capital of Mexico, Posing
Threat to U.S. Business, J. COMMERCE, Aug. 25, 1998, at Al (reviewing the
crime wave in Mexico); see also Roger Cowe, Kidnapping: The World's Top
Growth Industry, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 9, 1998, at 2 (examining the propensities
of kidnapping in Mexico).
" See Tim Padgett, Cop Crisis, TIME, Aug. 24, 1998, at 14 (reporting on corrupt
police officers and brutal crimes in Latin America); see also Sam Dillon, Murder
in Mexico: Reformers Uncover Police Plot, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1999, at A8 (re-
counting the horrific acts of five Mexican police officers).
10* See World Economic and Social Survey 1997, supra note 77, at 34-35 (declar-
ing that the recession in Mexico fueled a sharp increase in open unemployment
and poverty rates); see also Hamid Tabatabai, STATISTICS ON POVERTY AND
INCOME DISTRIBUTION (Int'l Labour Org., Geneva, 1996) (displaying poverty and
income distribution information for Mexico); Suchlicki, supra note 77, at 167-194
(describing the economic crisis in Mexico); The Evolution of Industrial Earnings
Inequality in Mexico and Brazil, supra note 76.
'0' The economic austerity also impacts the country's cultural life in countless
ways. See Henry Tricks, Mexico May End Food Subsidies, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 6,
1998, at 5 (reporting that Mexico's finance ministry will propose an end to subsi-
dies on food and energy as part of cost-saving efforts to compensate for a drop in
oil revenues); Julia Preston, A Museum In Mexico Suddenly Shuts Down, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 23, 1998, at BI (stating that what critics regarded as Mexico's finest
modem art museum was another victim of austerity and recession).
1596 [14:1571
BANIvNG AND FINANCIAL REFORM
1I. HOT MONEY AND THE "TEQUILA EFFECT"
While the peso collapse and the ensuing economic austerity pro-
gram brought hardship to Mexican society, these events should also
be seen as the origin of many of the most serious global financial dif-
ficulties. 10 2 Many utilize the term "Tequila Effect" to describe the ad-
verse impact of the peso collapse on the currencies of other emerging
market economies.' 3 According to the IMF's own surveys, this "Te-
quila Effect" spread throughout Latin America and East Asia as early
as mid-19952'" Asian financial markets began to decline in January
1995 "when pressures on Mexico began to intensify."'5 The most
pronounced market pressures zeroed in on the Thai baht,"' followed
by other foreign currencies.'0 7
This represented the very beginning of the "Asian Flu," the severe
and sudden collapse of a vast portion of the global economy. For
many years, Asian developing countries relied less than Latin
American developing countries on foreign borrowing from commer-
cial sources, at high or variable interest rates, or in dollar-
denominated debt.'08 Asian developing countries, however, began
'o2See generally Ffrench-Davis, supra note 57 (discussing impacts of the "Tequila
Effect" on various economies).
'1' See Carrasco & Thomas, supra note 53, at 571-72 (comparing the "Tequila Ef-
fect" to a "ripple impact" on other Latin American countries).
'o4See FOLKERTS-LANDAU & ITO, supra note 2, at 67.
o See id.
'06 See Philip Shenon, A Bad Week In the Asian Markets, Too, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
16, 1995, at D6 (declaring that aftershocks of Mexico's financial crisis continue
to pound emerging markets).
'1w See Ramon Moreno, What Caused East Asia's Financial Crisis? Reserve Bank
of San Francisco Economic Letter, No. 98-24 (Aug. 7, 1998) (remarking that the
collapse of Thai baht in July 1997 set off an unprecedented financial crisis in East
Asia); see also Nicholas D. Kristof & Sheryl WuDunn, Of World Markets, None
an Island, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1999, at Al, A8 (noting the global contagion's
ability to "infect" other countries).
'08 See Azizali F. Mohammed, Contrasting External Debt Experience: Asia and
Latin America, in BEYOND ADJUSTMENT: THE ASIAN EXPERIENCE 106-112 (Paul
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competing for foreign investment; many of them dismantled controls
on short-term capital inflows and became increasingly susceptible to
sudden outflows. Generally, East-Asia transformed from a tradition-
ally conservative financial region to one that relied heavily on short-
term private borrowing at market interest rates. This transformation
accelerated during the 1990s, because of the encouragement of the
neoliberal agendas of the Clinton administration' 9 and private finan-
cial interests."0
When the inevitable sudden outflow of short-term portfolio capital
occurred," currencies fell throughout Asia, including Hong Kong,
Streeten ed. Int'l Monetary Fund 1998) (comparing Asian and Latin American
debt statistics). Many IMF analysts did not see the storm approaching over Asia
until it actually broke. See Mussa & Goldstein, supra note 96, at 309 (dismissing
hot money concerns for Asian countries).
'0' Robert E. Rubin, United States Treasury Secretary from 1995 to 1999 and for-
mer chairman of Goldman Sachs & Company, an investment bank with a direct
interest in capital account liberalization, has been a prime mover of the financial
neoliberal agenda. See Nicholas D. Kristof & David E. Sanger, How U.S. Wooed
Asia To Let Cash Flow In, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1999, at Al, A10 (proclaiming
that the Clinton Administration pushed hard for financial liberalization and freer
capital flows with respect to Asia); see also Gillian Tett, Japan Plans to Open up
Part of Short-term Securities Market, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1998, at I (explaining
that Japan plans to open its short-term government debt market to foreign invest-
ment, in response to Rubin demands); Greta Steyn, Rubin Urges S. Africa to Em-
brace Globalisation, FIN. TIMES, July 15, 1998, at 6 (stating that Rubin urged Af-
rican governments to open goods and financial markets and embrace
globalization). One can only imagine the private sector opportunities that await
Mr. Rubin now that he has stepped down as Treasury Secretary in reward for his
public service in the private interest. See John M. Broder & David E. Sanger, Ru-
bin Resigning as Treasury Secretary, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1999, AI (recalling
the career of Rubin), Paul Blustein, Rubin, Placid Before Brickbats and Bouquets,
WASH. POST, July 2, 1999, El (reporting that Rubin is joining the New York-
based Council on Foreign Relations).
"o See Robert T. Parry, Development of Financial Services in the Asia Pacific: Is-
sues and Opportunities, Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Letter, No. 96-
18 (June 7, 1996). Parry is president and chief executive officer of the privately-
owned Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
' I See Peter John, $51 bn Fall in Bank Lending to Asia is Biggest in Decade, FIN.
TIMES, Nov. 30, 1998, at 1 (citing figures published by the Bank for International
Settlements of a $51.7 billion (or 14%) drop in bank lending to Asia in first half
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Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand.
The falling currencies threatened the already weak Japanese yen, and
placed pressure on the Chinese yuan. 112 Exacerbating the hot money
outflows was the dynamic of competitive devaluation of currencies,
so destructive during the Great Depression, in which "beggar thy
neighbor" currency price wars threw entire regional economies into a
downward spiral. "3 As one economist suggested, never before in
economic history has such a large part of the world fallen as fast as
Asia in the past few years.114
As the Asian Flu spread westward, the Russian ruble collapsed, 15
of 1998); see also Martin Meyer, The Asian Disease: Plausible Diagnoses, Possi-
ble Remedies: Regulation of Cross-Border Interbank Lending and Derivatives
Trade, PUB. POL'Y BRIEF No. 44 (Jerome Levy Economics Institute, Annandale-
on Hudson, 1998) (discussing the Asian financial crisis).
12 See Seth Faison, China's Economic Boss Resists Pressure to Devalue Cur-
rency, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1997, at A6; see also Ramon Moreno, Lessons from
Thailand, Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Letter, No. 97-33 (Nov. 7,
1997) (reporting on depreciation of Asian currencies); Sheryl WuDunn, As Japan
Goes, So Goes the Neighborhood, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1998, at D8 (quoting
China's central bank governor as saying the Yen's weakness was "having a very
negative impact on Chinese imports and exports and the utilization of foreign
capital"); Seth Faison, Beijing on the Brink?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1997, at A3
(reviewing the various troubles of China's ailing economy); Terry McCarthy, Is
China Next?, TIME, Sept. 21, 1998, at 78.
113 See CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, THE WORLD IN DEPRESSION 1929-1939
(1973); Kenneth Kasa, Contractionary Effects of Devaluation, Reserve Bank of
San Francisco Economic Letter, No. 98-34 (Nov. 13, 1998) (referring to the de-
cline in Asian economies); see also Kenneth Kasa, Export Competition and Con-
tagious Currency Crises, Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Letter, No.
98-1 (Jan. 16, 1998) (observing the erosion of Asian currencies).
.4 See Paul Krugman, Saving Asia: It's Time to Get Radical, FORTUNE, Sept. 7,
1998, at 75; see also EDDY LEE, THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS: THE CHALLENGE
FOR SOCIAL POLICY (1998) (noting the historically devastating economic decline
in Asia).
"5 See David E. Sanger, Next Asian Crisis? N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1998, at A12
(asserting that the recent panic that struck Russia looks very much like the next
phase of the Asian crisis, from the standpoint of Washington); see also Donald G.
McNeil Jr., Fierce Run on the Rand by Speculators Shocks South Africa, N.Y.
TIMES, July 1, 1998, at DI (discussing the devaluation of the Rand); Avi Machlis
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creating the prospect of social unrest and political turmoil in a coun-
try of vital geopolitical strategic importance." 6 The potential social
and political turmoil in other submerging countries should not be un-
derestimated.
11 7
The Russian bear market quickly threatened confidence in Weste-
rn bull markets and other emerging markets."8 For example, a col-
lapse in Brazil, the new front line in this global battleground," 9
would certainly pose a threat to Mexico. Brazil and Argentina are
and Alan Beattie, Falling Shekel Forces Interest Rate Rise, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 27,
1998, at 4 (describing the devaluation of the Shekel).
16 See Mead, supra note 56, at 162 (stating that "[s]ince the end of the Cold War,
Western policy toward Russia has been a textbook case in how to drive a people
to fascism"); see also Charles William Maynes, Squandering Triumph, 78:1
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 15 (1999) (analyzing economics in a post-Cold War era).
1,7 See Seth Mydans, New Violence Puts Indonesia's Military at a Crossroads,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1998, at Al (noting the dominant role of Indonesia's mili-
tary).
' See Diana Jean Schemo, Possible I.MF. Bailout Stirs Brazilians' Bitter Memo-
ries of 80's, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1998, at A19 (noting a speedy transmission of
Russian crisis to hot money outflow from Brazil); see also Peter Fritsch & Mi-
chael M. Phillips, Back to the Brink: Brazil's Devaluation Reignites Global Fears
Of Spreading Malaise, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 1999, at Al (stating that the eight-
een-month old global financial crisis, re-emerged as the head of Brazil's central
bank allowed the currency to fall in value by 8.3 % against the United States dol-
lar).
'9 See Stephen Fidler & Geoff Dyer, Brazil obtains $41bn rescue package, FIN.
TIMES, Nov. 14, 1998, at 4 (noting that the IMF eventually pieced together a $41
billion pre-emptive bailout of Brazil). But see Timothy A. Canova, Why Brazil
Will Fall, 10:11 ECON. REFORM 16 (1998) (arguing that the assistance package
was inherently flawed since it did not address the hot money problem); Jeffrey
Sachs & Steven Radelet, Next Stop: Brazil, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1998, at A23
(asserting that the policies that will likely form the core of the bailout package
could condemn Brazil to follow Asia into deep recession); Michael M. Weinstein,
Economic Scene: A Few Billion Dollar Fix that Won 't Untimately Cure Brazil,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1998, at C2 (asserting that neither the austerity plan spelled
out by Brazil nor the bailout package will solve its financial crisis).
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paying much higher interest rates as a result.20 This is rather dis-
turbing since neoliberals had hailed Argentina as the model of a very
well-run economy.'2' Argentina brought down its inflation rate to
near zero and its fiscal deficit to approximately 1% of its gross do-
mestic product.'22 Economic and financial fallout could even wash
ashore in the United States and Western Europe.'2" What is most
'20 See John Barham, Brazil Lifts Rates to 35.5% As Real Falls, FIN. TIMES, Jan.
28, 1999, at 3 (reporting that Brazil raised interest rates to 35.5% to help defend
its currency which has lost over one-third of its value since the government ter-
minated controlled exchange rates); see also Geoff Dyer, Real Keeps Falling as
Bank Confirms Decision to Float, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1999, at I (declaring that
the Brazilian Real weakened further against the dollar although the central bank
said it would continue to let the market decide the exchange rate); Ken Warn, Ar-
gentine Economy Spending in 1999 to be Held Stead'." Buenos Aires Keeps
Budget Reins Tight, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1998, at 6 (claiming that analysts ex-
pected the government to pay high interest rates to handle the debt); Geoff Dyer,
Dollar Ouyfoivs Putting Brazil Under Pressure, FIN. TIMEs, Oct 16, 1998, at 8
(declaring that in two months since the Russian crisis Brazil lost about S25 billion
in reserves from capital flight).
121 See Edward C. Snyder, The Menein Revolution in Argentina: Progress Toward
a Hemispheric Free Trade Area, 29 TExAS INT'L L.J. 95 (1994) (reviewing Ar-
gentina's dramatic economic improvement); see also Steve H. Hanke, Don't Cr
for Me, 10 INT'L ECON. 46 (1996) (praising Argentina's economy).
122 See Alberto F. Aldes, Currency Boards and Its Implications for Argentina,
ECON. RESEARCH 21, 22 (Goldman Sachs, Feb. 1995) (listing Argentina's eco-
nomic statistics). Argentina's currency board model presents particular danger
that a slowdown in capital inflows would quickly translate into loss of reserves by
the Central Bank, contraction of the money supply, sharply higher interest rates,
and economic slowdown. Id.
'2 See Jonathan Fuerbringer, Others' Risk of Contagion From Brazil, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 11, 1999, at CI (stating that several countries could face problems, either in
raising money or in defending their currencies, due to Brazil's currency plunge);
see also Clifford Krauss, Argentines Suffering From Brazil Crisis, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 8, 1999, at A8 (claiming that Brazil's suffering economy will effect the other
countries in the Mercosur trade union); Anthony Faiola, Ecuadorian Economy
Near Collapse; Bank Closures, Proposed Austeriy Measures Trigger Widespread
Protests, WASH. POST, Mar.17, 1999, at A22 (stating that like other Latin Ameri-
can countries, Equador has been injured by the collapse of the currency in Brazil);
Larry Rohter, Columbia Devalues Peso by 10% in Emergency Decree, N.Y.
TIMES, June 29, 1999, at C4 (describing speculative selling pressure on the Co-
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troubling about the dynamics of currency contagion, however, is that
the market seems to indiscriminately discipline bad as well as good
economic behavior, and the punishment is far too excessive. 14
This is the new political dynamic of our time, in which sovereign
governments have lost their ability to pursue policies of high eco-
nomic growth and full employment."' Mexico provides a perfect ex-
ample. It surrendered virtually all controls on hot money capital
flows, freed its central bank from democratic accountability, and
continued to raise interest rates to keep capital from fleeing.'26 In
early 1999, as Mexico's interbank interest rates rose above 40%, debt
burdens also rose. Yet, "faster depreciation of the peso raise[d] for-
eign debt service payments in peso terms, which also put pressure on
the public purse," and necessitated further cutbacks in government
lombian peso and the Government's failed attempts to defend the currency by
spending $275 million of its reserves in the foreign exchange market).
124 See Joseph Stiglitz, An Economic Taint South America Doesn't Deserve, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 16, 1998, at A29 (noting that the contagion, which results when in-
vestors realign their portfolios, has damaged seemingly unrelated countries and
regions); see also Alan Greenspan, Remarks to annual meeting of the Securities
Industry Association, (last modified Nov. 5, 1998 <http:\\www.bog.frb.us/board
docs/speeches/current/19981105.html> (stating that "market discipline today is
clearly far more draconian and less forgiving than twenty or thirty years ago");
Clifford Krauss, Latin Growth Weakens, With Joblessness Up, N.Y. TIMES, June
30, 1999, at Cl, C6 (describing economic deterioration in Latin America, includ-
ing sharply rising unemployment as effects of the global currency contagion).
Bear Steams estimated that the purchasing power of Latin America would con-
tract by $179 billion in 1999. The Bear Steams report concluded that Latin
America is under pressure as it prepares for the Federal Reserve to raise interest
rates "in the face of falling prices in much of the world." Id.
"25 See IRWIN P. STOTZKY, SILENCING THE GUNS IN HAITI: THE PROMISE OF
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 185 (1997) (offering a representative example of the
dilemma often faced by governments of developing countries, when Haitian
President Preval had the "arduous task of balancing two constituencies, one of
them being his domestic political followers who oppose free-market reforms, and
the other being the international donor nations seeking market reforms").
,26 See generally Gerardo Zuniga Villasenor, Mexico: Anti-Contagion Defences,
OXFORD ANALYTICA DAILY BRIEF, Jan. 18, 1999 (reporting that the central bank
was made independent of political direction in April 1994).
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spending for the poor and struggling middle-class.' 2' Tight monetary
policy and higher interest rates, however, remain the only politically
acceptable solutions to the threat of capital flight, even though such
solutions only compound a country's problems.'2
Capital controls-government restrictions on the flow of capital
between countries-represent an alternative solution. Capital con-
trols are dismissed as an option because "monetary authorities are
ideologically opposed to non-market instruments," and because
Mexico's long border with the United States "would render them
useless.', 9 These obstacles, however, may merely provide another
way of saying that the power of private financial markets and the
lack of United States leadership and cooperation stand in the way of
using alternative policy instruments.
A country that ignores the hot money threat and the dictates of
private financial markets faces the very real danger of capital flight
and a sharply falling currency. Scholars and journalists refer to this
dilemma as a "dual constituency conundrum," which pits the inter-
ests of voters against foreign currency traders and hedge fund man-
agers "who conduct moment-to-moment referendums" on the eco-
nomic and financial policies of developing and developed nations
alike.
3 0
'27 See id. (providing that the measures include a tax on telephone service and a
withdrawal of subsidy on tortillas, a food staple, while tax revenues continue to
decline since the global contagion and austerity programs have undermined the
price of Mexican oil exports.)
2 See id.; see also Henry Tricks, Mexican Inflation Setbackfor Bank, FIN. TIMES,
Jan.8, 1999, at 3 (reporting that Mexico's central Bank lost credibility with the
release of figures showing inflation reached 18.61% last year, a figure above the
government's 12% target).
29 See Tricks, supra note 128, at 3.
130 See STOTZKY, supra note 125. Presidential candidates, and even coup leaders,
of every political stripe now feel compelled to campaign on Wall Street, and to
meet with private bankers by video link-ups and at the annual IMF-World Bank
meeting. See David J. Rothkopf, WHzistle-Stops on Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
8, 1999, at A17 (explaining the dual constituency conundrum); see also MILES
KAHLER, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE POLITICAL INTEGRATION xi,
xviii (1995) (elaborating on the erosion of traditional national sovereignty);
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How did we get to this kind of world in which markets punish so
severely while sovereign governments are rendered impotent? First,
we did not learn the lessons from Mexico's collapse. 3 ' The same
causes of Mexico's collapse have continued to occur in submerging
countries around the world ever since the Mexican peso collapse."'
The dismal chain of events includes: (1) the liberalization of capital
accounts; (2) a dependence upon foreign investment; (3) a depend-
ence upon a particular type of foreign investment, short term hot
money portfolio investment; (4) the need to maintain high real inter-
est rates and overvalued exchange rates to attract and maintain suffi-
cient levels of foreign investment; (5) the adverse impact of overval-
ued exchange rates and high interest rates on a country's trade and
budget deficits; (6) the inevitable panic and rush to the door; and, fi-
nally, (7) the sudden outflow of capital, often triggered by an unfore-
seen event, but made inevitable by the unsustainable dependence on
hot money to finance burgeoning deficits. 133
Canova, supra note 7, at 1351-52 (discussing the veto-power of international
capital markets).
131 IMF analysts, committed to capital account liberalization, apparently refused to
acknowledge the dangers building throughout Asia and other emerging market
countries. See Mussa & Goldstein, supra note 96, at 309 n.5 I.
32 The global currency contagion has also reduced demand for commodities, fur-
ther undermining the economic and financial conditions within deficit countries.
See Gary Mead, Commodity price index at 21-year low, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 28,
1998, at 28; see also David Barboza, The Brazil Effect On Commodities, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 27, 1999, at Cl; Henry Tricks, Mexican budget hit by cut in oil
prices, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1998, at 4; Jonathan Fuerbringer, Commodities Price
Slide Victimizes Economies of Several Nations, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1998, at C 1.
33 See generally Cynthia C. Lichtenstein, Dealing with Sovereign Liquidity Cri-
ses: New International Initiatives for the New World of Volatile Capital Flows to
and from Emerging Markets, 29 MCGEORGE L. REv. 807 (1998) (detailing the
"Asian flu" contagion and preventative measures for pre-crisis emerging market
economies); see also Gary Weiss, The Man Who Moves Markets, BuS. WK., Aug.
23, 1993, at 50, 53 (citing George Soros' view that currency contagion results
from overvalued currencies, a tight monetary policy, and high real interest rates);
George Soros, The Capitalist Threat, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb. 1997, at 45 (as-
serting that capitalism has replaced communism as the main enemy of an open
democratic society).
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This neoliberal financial regime is built on a mixture of free mar-
ket ideology and crass economic self-interest.'14 For instance, con-
sider the emergence of hedge funds as players in the global financial
system. A hedge fund is an unregulated fund of less than one hun-
dred wealthy investors who seek to move their capital around the
globe in a nanosecond.'35 Even Alan Greenspan, the Chairman of the
United States Federal Reserve Board, acknowledged that he did not
know the number of hedge funds that were presently operating in the
United States or offshore during questioning from the House Bank-
ing Committee in the fall of 1998. '36 His ignorance on such a matter
may not be entirely unexpected.'37 Hedge funds are not regulated and
4 Keynes may have been overly optimistic when he concluded that "the power of
vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of
ideas." See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT,
INTEREST, AND MONEY 383 (1964 ed.).
,3' Hedge funds operate under the Investment Company Act of 1940 exemption
for funds of less than 100 private investors; are incorporated offshore; or operate
under the 1966 amendment to Federal securities laws that exempts from regula-
tion funds with fewer than 500 "sophisticated" institutions or individuals in which
the individuals invest more than $5 million and institutions invest more than S25
million. See Leslie Wayne, Congress to Debate Greater Oversight of Hedge
Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1998, at Cl (detailing congressional debate regarding
hedge funds); see also Stevenson, supra note 41, at B2.
136 See Federal Reserve Board Testimony of Chairman Alan Greenspan [herein-
after Greenspan Testimony] (last modified Oct. 1, 1999) <http:\\www.bog.frb.usl
boarddocs/testimony/1998/19981001.html> (reporting that Greenspan warned
that any direct United States regulation of hedge funds would drive the funds to
offshore jurisdictions); see also Canova, supra note 7, at 1306-09 (claiming that a
race to the bottom necessitates harmonization of financial regulations of compet-
ing jurisdictions); Robert M. Morgenthau, "On the Trial of Global Capital," N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 9, 1998, A29 (essay written by New York County District Attorney
and son of Henry Morgenthau, Jr., the great Secretary of the Treasury throughout
the New Deal and during the Bretton Woods Conference); John Steele Gordon,
History Repeats in Finance Company Bailouts, WALL ST. J., Oct. 7, 1998, at A22
(concluding that the financial crisis in Asia and Russia has shown that the juris-
diction of regulators over financial institutions should extend internationally, even
at the risk of encroaching upon another States' sovereignty); Reed Abelson, Sur-
vey Shows Big Growth in Hedge Fund Popularity, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1998, at
C3.
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are not even registered with the Federal Reserve. 3 Greenspan opined
that there could be hundreds of other Long Term Capitals out there
ready to fail or in the process of failing, which explains why the
Federal Reserve's Open Market Committee held an emergency
meeting in mid-October 1998 to quickly add liquidity to financial
markets. 140
It is increasingly clear to a growing number of economists that
capital account liberalization is the primary factor within the control
of policymakers that is contributing to financial and economic tur-
moil around the world.14 ' As countries dismantled their capital con-
trols, a huge expansion in the volume of capital flows occurred. The
daily volume of global foreign exchange trading now exceeds $1.3
trillion.4 In 1977, global foreign exchange trading represented about
"' See MARTIN MAYER, THE BANKERS: THE NEXT GENERATION 370, 402-03
(1997); see also ALEXANDER COCKBURN & KEN SILVERSTEIN, WASHINGTON
BABYLON 276-80 (1996) (commenting on the many victims of Greenspan and
upon his involvement in the Savings and Loan debacle).
's See supra notes 27-28, 135-136 and accompanying text.
'9 See supra Greenspan Testimony note 136; see also Stephen Fidler, Greenspan
sees signs of an end to "investor fright," FIN. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1998, at 20; Jacob
M. Schlesinger & Michael Schroeder, Greenspan's Hedge-Fund Portrait is Stark,
WALL ST. J., Oct 2, 1998, at A3; Joseph Kahn & Peter Truell, Investors Fear
Trouble at Another Hedge Fund, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1998, at C 1.
"o See Barnhart, supra note 47 and accompanying text; see also Stevenson, supra
note 41 and accompanying text; Gretchen Morgenson, Investors View Fed 's Rate
Cut as Too Timid, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1998, at C1.
"'t See Jagdish Bhagwati, The Capital Myth: The Difference Between Trade in
Widgets and Dollars, 77 FOREIGN AFF. 7 (1998) (criticizing the ideology that free
capital mobility is more desirable than restraints on capital movement); see also
KEVIN PHILLIPS, ARROGANT CAPITAL (1994); Greider, supra note 24 (attributing
the exorbitant interest rates in Mexico to the free movement of capital); Martin
Wolf, Wisdom of Free Flows questioned, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1998; Nicholas D.
Kristof, As Free-Flowing Capital Sinks Nations, Experts Prepare to 'Rethink
System', N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1998, at 6; Robert Kuttner, Global Financial
Crashes are Excesses of Free Markets, ALBQ. J., Sept. 11, 1998, at A 16.
42 See David Felix, On Drawing General Policy Lessons From Recent Latin
American Currency Crises, 20 J. POST KEYNESIAN ECON. 191, 198 (1998).
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three and one-half half times the volume of annual global exports. By
1995, it grew to about sixty-four times that amount.'" In 1977, the
ratio of central banks' global official reserves to daily foreign ex-
change turnover was about fifteen days. Eighteen years later, it is
only about one day.'" Accordingly, the combined total of all central
bank reserves equals only about one day's worth of foreign exchange
trading. This begs the question, namely what chance does a single
central bank have to protect its currency by open market interven-
tions in the face of a sustained market reaction against that currency?
When a central bank intervenes in isolation to support its currency
against a sustained sell-off, it is in essence handing its foreign re-
serves over to the speculators. This results in heavy losses for the
central bank and huge profits for private speculators,"" including
hedge funds, foreign exchange departments of commercial banks,
and other financial institutions.'" One market observer noted that
currency traders have become rich by posturing themselves in the
market contrary to the positions of central banks. Moreover, the for-
eign exchange traders realize enormous gains from central bank in-
terventions which, instead of adding stability to markets, causes in-
creased volatility. The commentator argues further that trader and
central banker are often the same, with, at minimum, half a dozen
previous governors of the Federal Reserve currently holding high-
paying jobs on Wall Street, where they furnish advice to currency
and bond traders.
47
143 See id. at 200.
'44 See id.
141 See Jane D'Arista & Tom Schlesinger, Reforning the Privatized International
Monetary System, 2 FOMC ALERT 1, 2 (Dec. 22, 1998); Sam Dillon, MArico's
Central Bank Fails in Attempt to Prop Up peso, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1998, at
C4.
'46 See GREIDER, supra note 24, at 240-41 (recounting how speculator George So-
ros had broken the Bank of England's defense of the British pound in September
1992, and made nearly S1 billion in profit in the process).
141 See Michael Lewis, For Love of Money: Why Central Bankers and Speculators
Need Each Other, 74 FOREIGN AFF. 137, 139, 141 (1995) (reviewing GREGORY J.
MiLLMAN, THE VANDALS' CROWN: How REBEL CURRENCY TRADERS
OVERTHREW THE WORLD'S CENTRAL BANKS (1995)); see also STEVEN
1999] 1607
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
The symbiotic relationship between the regulators and private fi-
nancial institutions raises important questions about the political pro-
cess, 48 and the democratic accountability of central banks and fi-
nance ministries. 49 It must be comforting for central bankers and
their research economists to look forward to promising future career
options with private financial institutions. Conveniently, the same
private financial institutions also possess an interest in keeping their
future employees actively intervening in the currency and bond mar-
kets.5 This symbiotic relationship also casts doubt on the efficacy of
central bank interventions in currency and other markets,' 1 but the
SOLOMON, THE CONFIDENCE GAME (1995); DANIEL YERGIN & JOSEPH
STANISLAW, THE COMMANDING HEIGHTS (1997).
14 Political scientists have long been concerned with such dynamics of revolving
doors, iron triangles, and agency capture by private regulated industries and their
interest groups). See D. GRIER STEPHENSON, JR., ET AL., AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT 258, 522-23 (1992); see also THEODORE LOWI, THE END OF
LIBERALISM 33-35, 58 (1979).
"9 See Bernstein, supra note 95 and accompanying text; see also Timothy A.
Canova, Law School's Blindfold: The Downsizing of the American Dream,
BROOK. L. DIG. 19, 25-29 (1996) (questioning the constitutionality of the auton-
omy of the Federal Reserve, and criticizing law schools and legal scholars for not
discussing the Federal Reserve's independence from the other three branches of
government); Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting the Unitary Executive: Congressional
Delegations of Administrative Authority Outside the Federal Government, 85
NW. U. L. REV. 62, 84-85, n.66 (1990) (criticizing congressional delegation of
power to private organizations, which sometimes results in broad power being
concentrated in private individuals, such as the Federal Reserve Banks); see gen-
erally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 131-134 (1980); DAVID
SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY (1993).
'5o See Simon Romero, Brazilian Central Bank Plans A Currency Insider Inquiry,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1999, at C6; Simon Romero, As Brazil Devalued, Some Got
Rich, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1999, at C4; see also Richard K. Lyons, Explaining
Trading Volume in Foreign Exchange: Lessons from Tokyo, Reserve Bank of San
Francisco Economic Letter No. 97-38 (Dec. 26, 1997) (asserting that dealers who
receive advance knowledge of a central bank's currency intervention operations
"[have] superior information for forecasting exchange rate movements").
'' See D'Arista & Schlesinger, supra note 145 and accompanying text; see also
Milton Friedman, The Case for Overhauling the Fed, 28 CHALLENGE 4, at 6
(1985) (criticizing the Federal Reserve for "churning" its accounts by unnecessary
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IMF's other preferred policy alternative, that of raising interest rates
ever higher, also ultimately fails to prop up the currency. Consider
the case of Sweden in the early 1990s. The Swedish currency, the
krona, came under speculative attack. The Riksbank, Sweden's cen-
tral bank, tried to defend the currency by raising interest rates. The
Riksbank raised the overnight interest rate to over 500% over a two-
week period.5 2 The Swedish economy and banking system, however,
collapsed under the weight of the interest rates, and the strategy
failed in its primary objective to support the value of the krona. Try-
ing to defend the value of a currency with high interest rates is a very
dangerous course of action. Along the way, those high interest rates
compound the financial and economic crisis, contribute to passive
government budget deficits,'53 and deepen a recession. The World
Bank acknowledged these dangers in the fall of 1998 when it dis-
tanced itself from the IMF. In a rather unprecedented split between
these institutions, the World Bank publicly blamed the IMF and the
United States Treasury for worsening the global financial crisis, and
for increasing the hardship for millions of people as a result of pro-
grams of economic austerity, high interest rates, and recession."
and excessive buying and selling of government securities to add profits to the
bond-dealing operations of its private constituency).
152 See Timothy A. Canova, The Swedish Model Betrayed, 37 CHALLENGE 36
(1994).
'5' See Timothy A. Canova & Lynn Turgeon, Fighting the Wrong Deficit, in
MELTDOWN 206-07 fV. Krehm, ed. 1999) (explaining that passive deficits result
from slow economic growth, underutilization of resources, declining tax reve-
nues, and/or rising interest costs, whereas active deficits result from the govern-
ment spending more than it collects in taxes at full employment); see also Gillian
Tett, Japan Warns of S82.6bn Tax Shortfall, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1998, at 1
(stating that Japan's tax shortfall is due to economic slowdown).
'" See David E. Sanger, U.S. and LM.F. Made Asia Crisis Worse, World Bank
Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1998, at Al; see also Mark Landler, Grim Assessment
by U.N. of Economic Slide in Asia, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1998, at A8 (reporting
that the International Labor Organization ("ILO") reported dramatic worsening in
social and economic conditions throughout Asia); James D. Wolfensohn, The
Other Crisis, (last modified Oct.6, 1998) <http:lvwwv.worldbank.orgthtmltextdr/
am98/jdw-sp/am98-en.html.>; David E. Sanger, As Economies Fail, the I.M.F. Is
Ripe with Recriminations, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.2, 1998, at Al.
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IV. FOUNDATIONS OF THE NEOLIBERAL
FINANCIAL REGIME: THE CONTAGION OF
NEOLIBERAL REFORM
The proliferation of short-term capital flows occurred because of
conscious government decisions to liberalize capital accounts, and to
abolish any and all kinds of controls on short-term portfolio capital
flows. "'55 The Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary
Fund ("Articles"), otherwise known as the 1944 Bretton Woods
Agreement,'5 6 contain a specific provision, Article VI, which ex-
pressly provides member countries with a very important policy tool,
namely the right to impose exchange controls and restrictions on
capital flows.'5 7 According to Article VI, "[m]embers may exercise
such controls as are necessary to regulate international capital
movements, but no member may exercise these controls in a manner
which will restrict payments for current transactions."'58
This is an important distinction between capital and current trans-
actions. The Articles define current transactions as including pay-
ments due in connection with foreign trade, interest due on loans,
and net income from other investments. Payments made for the pur-
pose of transferring capital, however, do not fall under this defini-
tion.'59 The Articles consider current transactions, such as payments
"' History has been repeated with the liberalization of capital flows. Unregulated
capital flows contributed to the global financial and economic instability of the
Great Depression. See generally JOHN GRAY, FALSE DAWN: THE DELUSIONS OF
GLOBAL CAPITALISM (1999); KINDLEBERGER, supra note 113.
,16 See Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945,
60 Stat. 1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 39 [hereinafter Articles].
"' See id. at art. VI, sec. 3; see generally Franhois Gianviti, The IMF and the Lib-
eralization of Capital Markets, 19 Hous. J. INT'L L. 773, 776 (1997) (explaining
capital outflows under the IMF).
" See Articles, supra note 156, at art. VI, sec. 3.
'59 See id. at art. XXX(d) (indicating that the payment or liquidation of the princi-
pal of an investment, including a short-term portfolio investment, would be con-
sidered as a capital transaction).
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for goods and repatriation of profits, ' as essential for the smooth
operation of international trade. Accordingly, under Article VIII,
member countries are obligated to avoid restrictions on current pay-
ments. Article VIII requires members to consult with and to obtain
the approval of the IMF to impose restrictions on current transac-
tions.162 Article IV gives the IMF surveillance powers over a wide
range of members' economic and financial policies."' In contrast,
Article VI's restrictions on capital transactions require no such IMF
consultations or surveillance.
The Articles are very explicit in favoring the use of restrictions on
capital transactions over restrictions on current transactions." The
chief negotiators at Bretton Woods, Harry Dexter White, the assis-
tant United States Treasury Secretary, and John Maynard Keynes,
the great British economist, envisioned the Article VI provision as a
crucial instrument to control the kind of speculative capital flows that
occurred before World War II, and which destabilized the global
economy during the Great Depression. 6 Keynes supported Article
'
6
0 See KEITH S. RosENN, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN BRAZIL (1991) (discussing the
difference between the repatriation of profits and capital, and indicating that the
payment of interest due on loans and net income from other investments consti-
tutes repatriation of profits).
,61 See Articles, supra note 156, at art. VIII, sec. 2 (establishing that the only ex-
ceptions to the prohibition against current restrictions are found in Article VII,
sec. 3 (b), the "scarce currency clause", and Article XIV, sec. 2, which provides
for a transitional period until full current account convertibility is completed); see
also infra notes 288-91 and accompanying text.
'
62 See Articles, supra note 156, at art. VIII, sec. 2.
63 Seeid. at art. IV.
1 See id. at art. VI, sec. 1(a) (providing the IMF with the power to require "a
member to exercise such controls [on capital transfers]"); see also Gianviti, supra
note 157, at 776-77.
64 See ROBERT W. DIMAND, Bretton Woods, in AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF KEYNESIAN
ECONOMICS 50-53 (1997) (discussing Bretton Woods, where White chaired the
commission on the IMF, Keynes chaired the commission on the World Bank, and
Eduardo Suarez of Mexico chaired the commission on other forms of financial
cooperation); see also GRAY, supra note 155; KINDLEBERGER, supra note 113.
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VI as: "a permanent arrangement [that] accords to every member
government the explicit right to control all capital movements. What
used to be heresy is now endorsed as orthodox... [i]t follows that
our right to control the domestic capital market is secured on [a]
firmer foundation than ever before."'
66
Article VI was not just a theoretical power; capital controls were
widely used throughout Western Europe to shield those countries
from speculative capital flows during post-war reconstruction. 67 In
fact, for most Western European countries, capital controls remained
in place throughout most of the 1950s, and for some countries until
the early 1990s.' 6' Restrictions on hot money capital flows meant
Western European countries could pursue two of the explicit pur-
poses of the Bretton Woods Agreement,169 namely high growth and
full employment, without being overly concerned about the possibil-
ity of speculative runs on their currencies.
In recent years, however, the IMF undermined and eroded the Ar-
ticle VI policy tool through the adoption of a program of capital ac-
count liberalization."0 As recently as the spring of 1998, the IMF dis-
"Keynes referred to short-term capital movements as "fugitive funds" and at-
tempted to construct a system of national exchange controls between both the
sending and receiving countries. See Cooling Down Hot Money, 2 ECON. JUST.
REP. 4 (June 1994); see also Zamora, supra note 96 and accompanying text; see
generally LINDA MCQUAIG, THE CULT OF IMPOTENCE: SELLING THE MYTH OF
POWERLESSNESS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 223-24 (1998) (reporting that Keynes
and White attempted, but failed to achieve provision for "co-operative" controls
to require governments to help each other enforce capital controls by tracking
down and returning wayward funds).
16' See Mussa & Goldstein, supra note 96, at 252; see also infra notes 282-87 and
accompanying text.
161 See infra note 287 and accompanying text.
161 See Articles, supra note 156, at Article I (ii) (among the purposes the of IMF
were to "facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade, and
to contribute thereby to the promotion and maintenance of high levels of em-
ployment and real income and to the development of the productive resources of
all members as primary objectives of economic policy").
170 See Sara Kane, Seminar Discusses the Orderly Path to Capital Account Liber-
alization, 27 IMF SURV. 81, 83 (International Monetary Fund, Mar. 23, 1998)
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cussed a possible amendment to the Articles to provide for explicit
jurisdiction over the process of capital account liberalization.""' The
IMF has focused the burden of adjustment on deficit countries, while
virtually ignoring the dynamics of hot money speculative flows that
victimize those same countries.'7 Without an explicit mandate and
despite the Article VI provision, the IMF effectively pushed capital
liberalization through its surveillance, financing, and technical as-
sistance activities.'
It is rather perverse and ironic that at the very moment that a
country is sinking under the weight of the hot money problem, it
must bend once again to permit even further capital account liberali-
zation as a condition for badly-needed IMP financial assistance."
The schizophrenic nature of relations is captured in the so-called
"Letters of Intent," which are drafted by and yet formally addressed
to the IMF.75 The Letters of Intent, which list the many steps that the
submerging country promises to undertake in exchange for IMF aid,
include such measures as economic austerity, privatization, and lib-
eralization.
17 6
(expressing the need to amend the Articles so as to meet the demands of the in-
creasing liberalization of capital movement); see also Capital Movements Under
an Anzendnent of the IMF's Articles, ANN. REP. 1998 74 (International Monetary
Fund 1998) (questioning the need to strengthen the IMF's control over capital re-
strictions through a proposed amendment of the IMF Articles).
1
7 1 See Kane supra note 170 and accompanying text.
"' See infra notes 270-71 and accompanying text (concerning the asymmetrical
burden of adjustment on deficit countries).
'T See Kane, supra note 170 and accompanying text.
'74See Larry Rohter, New I.M.F. Aid Pact Further Limits Brazil, N.Y. TIMEs,
Mar. 9, 1999, at Cl; see also Geoff Dyer, Brazil Vows to Continue Privatization,
FIN. TIMEs, Nov. 25, 1998, at 7.
175 See International Monetary Fund, (visited June 12, 1999) <http:i/vww.imf.
org/extemallnp/loi> (providing copies of some of these Letters of Intent).
176 Since the United States is the dominant power within the IMF, it is not sur-
prising that this agenda is often closely linked with United States policy. See
David E. Sanger, Greenspan Sees Asian Crisis Moving World to Western Capi-
talism, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1998, at Cl; see also Nicholas D. Kristof, Asians
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In pushing capital account liberalization, the IMF has been re-
sponding to the demands of capital-exporting nations and their pri-
vate banking and financial constituencies.' Likewise, the World
Trade Organization ("WTO"), which is the direct descendant of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), has strongly
pushed the same liberalization agenda.7 7 The Organization of Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development ("OECD"), a group of about
twenty-nine of the more developed nations, has actively pushed for
free capital mobility among its members through its own Code of
Liberalisation of Capital Accounts (the "Code").'7 The Code covers
a wide range of capital movements, including hot money flows such
Worry that U.S. Aid is a New Colonialism, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1998, at A4; see
also photo of South Korean protest march against policies imposed by the IMF in
which a protester was holding a sign that read, "I.M.F., I'M Fired." N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 30, 1998, at Cl.
... The adoption of the General Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS") at the
Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations is expected to open Pacific Ba-
sin economies to international banking, even though it could raise problems re-
lated to "speculative capital flows." See Ramon Moreno, GA TS and Banking in
the Pacific Basin, Fed. Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Letter, No. 94-
19 (May 13, 1994).
"' See Joint Statement by the Heads of the International Monetary Fund, the
World Bank, and the World Trade Organization, IMF News, No. 98/37 (Oct. 16,
1998) (visited Oct. 20, 1998) <http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/nb/
1998/NB9837.htm> (urging further liberalization and integration of financial
markets); see also Masamichi Kono & Ludger Schuknecht, Financial Services
Trade, Capital Flows, and Financial Stability, Staff Working Paper ERAD 98-12
(World Trade Organization, Geneva, Nov. 1998); Guy de Jonquieres, Liberaliza-
tion is Good for Stability, Says WTO Study, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1998, at 9.
"' See Cynthia C. Lichtenstein, The New Financial World of Cross Border Capi-
tal Movements: The International Monetary Fund Agreement in light of the 1994
Mexico peso Crash, in WAHRUNG UND WIRTSCHAFT: DAS FELD IM RECHT,
FESTSCHRIFT FUR PROFESSOR DR. HUGO J. HAHN, NoMos VERLASGESELLSCIAFT
191, 195 (1997) (using the OECD Code as an example of how countries and or-
ganizations separate from the IMF embrace the ideology of free capital movement
and support the removal of capital barriers); see also Christian Weller, Global
Banking, 3 FOREIGN POL'Y IN FOCUS (1998) (Interhemispheric Resource Center
& Inst. for Pol'y Studies, Albuquerque, N.M.), May 1998, at 1 (opposing recent
efforts by the OECD to further liberalize and deregulate the flow of capital).
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as operations in securities, money markets, and foreign exchange."M
Mexico's membership in the OECD merits particular attention,"'
because of its significance in terms of the Bank for International Set-
tlement's ("BIS") risk-based capital requirements, also known as the
"Basle Accord."18 2 The Basle Accord put a zero weighting on credit
risk for the central government debt of all OECD countries, which by
mid-1994 included Mexico."3 Thus, at the time of the Mexican peso
crash, banks from around the globe could hold Mexican government
debt securities without providing any capital reserves for credit risk.
This combined OECD-BIS stamp of approval was certainly a pre-
mature inducement to free flows in a particularly volatile form of
capital. This type of capital investment, mainly short-term Mexican
government debt, resulted in significant losses for United States and
other banks, necessitated a multibillion dollar bailout package, and
sparked the global currency contagion."'
The OECD has also pushed negotiations for a Multilateral Agree-
18 See Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements (Organization for Economic
Co-Operation and Development, 1997) [hereinafter OECD Code] (Art. 1(d) of
this Code obligates all OECD members to "endeavour to extend the measures of
liberalisation to all members of the International Monetary Fund").
'8' See id. at 2 (Mexico became a member of the OECD through accession on May
18, 1994).
82 See generally Hal S. Scott, The Competitive Implications of the Basle Capital
Accord, 39 ST. Louis U. L.J. 885, 886 (1995) (explaining the structure and pur-
poses of the Basle Accord).
'See generally HAL S. SCOTT & PHILIP A. WELLONS, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE
268-69 (1998); MELTDOWN: MONEY, DEBT, AND THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 270,
310 (W. Krehm ed., 1999). For proposed revisions in risk management standards
for banks, see also Framework for Supervisory Information About Derivatives
and Trading Activities, Joint Report by the BIS Basle Committee on Banking Su-
pervision and the Technical Committee of the International Organization of Secu-
rities Commissions (Sept. 1998).
'" See Louis Uchitelle, U.S. Losses in Meico Assessed, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26,
1994, at A6 (noting the loss to American investors caused by the decline in value
of the Mexican peso); see also Kenneth N. Gilpin, Far-Reaching Effects Seen if
Mexico Rescue is Halted, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1995, at D1 (discussing the possi-
ble impact of the failure of Congress to approve a rescue package for Mexico).
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ment on Investment ("MAI") for OECD members and non-
members.8 5 According to the OECD, the MAI is based on the Code
and would "provide legal guarantees" for investments, including the
making of portfolio investments.16 If enacted, the MAI would effec-
tively overturn Article VI of the IMF Articles on a grand multilateral
scale. For the time being, however, intense opposition by trade un-
ions and environmental groups forced the suspension of MAI nego-
tiations due to their concerns regarding the broad rights that MAI
would grant to corporations to challenge national laws and regula-
tions.'87
While the OECD's multilateral attempt to enshrine capital liberali-
zation in international law has not met immediate success, bilateral
efforts have. For the past two decades, developed countries have
pressured developing countries to liberalize their capital accounts
through hundreds of bilateral investment treaties, such as the U.S.
State Department's Bilateral Investment Treaty ("BIT") program."'
NAFTA's investment provisions are "a direct descendant of the
United States model Bilateral Investment Treaty."'8 9 Not surprisingly,
' See The Multilateral Agreement on Investment, OECD Pol'y Brief No. 2-1997,
reprinted at <http://www.foe.org/intemational/trade/ mail/mai/html> (visited June
9, 1999).
16 See id.
'"See Samer Iskandar, France quits investment accord talks, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 15,
1998, at 6 (reporting on the French withdrawal from MAI negotiations); see also
Guy de Jonquieres, Retreat over OECD pact on investment, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 21,
1998, at 4 (reporting on the withdrawal of several nations from MAI talks); see
generally THE MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT, supra note 185 and
accompanying text.
' It was during the time of another neoliberal Democrat, the Carter administra-
tion, that the BIT program was first launched. See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, U.S.
Bilateral Investment Treaties: The Second Wave, 14 MICH. J. INT'L L. 621, 622
(1993).
"9 See Alvarez, supra note 65, at 303-04. The United States has negotiated more
than 40 BITs with foreign countries. See List of US. Bilateral Investment Treaties
(visited June 10, 1999) <http://www.state.gov/www.issues/economic/
6proto.html.> (listing and providing the text of many actual United States BITs).
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BITs typically define "investment" to include private debt and equity
securities, the raw material of hot money flows.'9 By granting United
States investors the right to freely transfer such investments,"' the
BIT program has undermined the ability of developing countries to
adopt Article VI restrictions on capital transfers.
The primary objective of developing countries in negotiating a
BIT with the United States or some other developed country is to at-
tract foreign investment.' 92 As Dean Salacuse argues, while the BIT
program "purports to create a symmetrical legal relationship between
the two [contracting] states," in reality an asymmetry exists since the
developing country is in need of, and dependent upon, United States
sources for scarce capital investment.'9 According to Dean Vande-
velde, "[flor many developing countries, the BIT represents a tangi-
ble way of signaling their receptivity to foreign investment, and thus
may seem to assist in attracting capital from the United States and
other developed countries. ' 4
Consequently, the United States is in a stronger bargaining posi-
tion to condition other official benefits for the developing country on
' See Joseph E. Pattison, The United States-Egypt Bilateral Investment Treaty: A
Prototype For Future Negotiation, 16 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 305, 316 (1983) (not-
ing that one United States BIT defines "investment" as all "equity, debt, service
and investment contracts"); see also Wayne Sachs, The New U.S. Bilateral In-
vestment Treaties, 2 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAW. 192, 203-08 (1984) (discussing
definitional aspects of investments and investors in various BITs).
'9' See Mark S. Bergman, Bilateral hIvestment Protection Treaties: An Eramina-
tion of the Evolution and Significance of the U.S. Protoype Treaty, 16 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 1, 19-20 (1983) (enumerating the rights to purchase and transfer
investments under the United States prototype BIT).
'9 See Jeswald W. Salacuse, BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment
Treaties and Their Impact on Foreign Investment in Developing Countries, 24:3
INT'L LAW. 655, 661 (1990).
'93 See id. at 663.
'94See Vandevelde, supra note 188, at 638.
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that country's agreement to the BIT.' 9 Moreover, the BIT is a "con-
fidence-building" measure that sends a green light to the private in-
vestment community.1 96
Developed and developing nations have signed over three hundred
BITs 9 7 As Salcuse notes, "in thirty years, the nations of the world
fashioned an instrument of public international law to create rules for
private foreign investments .... "' 9' By requiring bilateral liberaliza-
tion of capital flows, the BIT program significantly undermined the
important policy instrument of capital controls, a policy option ex-
pressly permitted under the IMF Articles of Agreement."99 Therefore,
a multilateral framework for dealing with capital account liberaliz-
ation and restrictions has been largely supplanted by bilateral ar-
rangements that reflect and reproduce the power disparities among
capital-exporting countries, private financial institutions, and the de-
veloping world.2 °°
V. A PATH FOR REFORM
A. EXCHANGE RATE STABILITY
The liberalization of global capital flows has contributed to the
' See Salacuse, supra note 192 at 661-63 (noting that "those benefits may in-
clude participation in the United States foreign investment insurance program,
and United States political support and economic assistance").
196 See id. at 674.
"" See id. at 655.
'9' See id.
'99 See id.
20 The bilateral approach of the BIT program is contrary to the multilateral prin-
ciple of the Bretton Woods and GATT post-war trading system. See BETH V.
YARBROUGH & ROBERT M. YARBROUGH, COOPERATION AND GOVERNANCE IN
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 5 (1992).
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extreme volatility in exchange rates.:" Countries have lost their
autonomy to pursue expansionary economic policies as they have
been forced to compete for foreign investment. This has led to the
neutralization of fiscal policy and the ascendancy of monetary policy
as the one and only policy tool to deal with every policy problem,
from inflation to unemployment and exchange rate stability."2 This
over-reliance on monetary policy has, in turn, contributed to ex-
tremely high real interest rates, slower economic growth, and the
general retreat from policies of full employment. : '
In 1994, former Federal Reserve chairman Paul Volcker chaired a
commission known as the Bretton Woods Commission. Its work co-
incided with the fiftieth anniversary of the Bretton Woods Confer-
ence. The Bretton Woods Commission concluded:
Since the early 1970s, long-term growth in the major industri-
alized countries has been cut in half, from about 5 percent a
year to about 2.5 percent a year. Although many factors con-
tributed to this decline in different countries at different times,
low growth has been an international problem, and the loss of
201 See MAXWELL WATSON, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS:
DEVELOPMENTS AND PROSPECTS 15 (International Monetary Fund, Jan. 1988);
FELIX, supra note 142, at 191.
202 See generally Timothy A. Canova, The Macroeconomics ofl William Vickrey,
40:2 CHALLENGE 95 (1997). The first Nobel laureate in economics, the late Dutch
economist Jan Tinbergen, often said that we should have at least as many policy
tools as there are policy objectives. Tinbergen recognized the futility of attempt-
ing to achieve multiple objectives (i.e., full employment, price stability, and equi-
librium in the balance of payments) with only one policy instrument (i.e., mone-
tary policy). See JAN TINBERGEN, ECONOMIC POLICY: PRINCIPLES AND DESIGN
53-56 (1956). This suggests that we should consider capital controls to comple-
ment other policy instruments designed to achieve multiple objectives. See
MCQUAIG, supra note 166, at 254-55 (according to the Mundell-Fleming thesis,
nations can achieve only two of the following three policy objectives: stable ex-
change rates, free capital mobility, and policy autonomy, such as full employ-
ment).
203 See JAMES MEDOFF & ANDREW HARLESS, THE INDEBTED SOCIETY (1996); see
also SIDNEY HOMER & RICHARD SYLLA, A HISTORY OF INTEREST RATES 386,
430 (1991) (examining the fluctuation of interest rates in Europe and North
America).
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exchange rate discipline has played a part.0 4
The Commission was surprisingly critical of liberalized exchange
rates, and recommended a return to some kind of regime of semi-
fixed exchange rates in order to encourage increased global trade and
economic growth.
If countries regained some measure of control over hot money
speculative capital flows, there is a good chance for a return to ex-
change rate stability. With such stability, there is also a good chance
that countries would be empowered to once again pursue full em-
ployment and a host of other progressive social policy objectives.
Political leaders in Western Europe, particularly in France and Ger-
many, have recognized the need for exchange rate stability, 2° but
204 See Bretton Woods Commission, Bretton Woods: Looking to the Future,
Commission Report (1994); see also Greider, supra note 24, at 250.
205 See Raymond F. Mikesell, Revisiting Bretton Woods: Proposals for Reforming
the International Monetary Institutions, PUB. POL'Y BRIEF No. 24, (Jerome Levy
Economics Institute, 1996); THE BRETTON WOODS-GATT SYSTEM: RETROSPECT
AND PROSPECT AFTER FIFTY YEARS (0. Kirshner ed., 1996); see also Elizabeth
Olson, World Trade Study Says Export Growth May Slow Further, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 23, 1999, CI (noting the decline in growth of world merchandise exports,
which resulted from the Asian economic crisis).
20* See Ralph Atkins, Schroder favours plan for currency targets, FIN. TIMES,
Sept. 29, 1998, at 1 (reporting that Germany's chancellor-designate called for
stronger international co-operation to avert global recession); see also David E.
Sanger, Chirac, in U.S., Offers Alternative Approach to Economic Crisis, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 19, 1999, Al (reporting on Chirac's urging that the United States, Ja-
pan, and Europe manage the exchange rates of their currencies, keeping them
within specific zones agreed upon by the major nations), Michiyo Nakamoto,
Obuchi to Callfor New Currency Era, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1999, at 2 (reporting on
the Japanese prime minister's plans for currency stabilization), John Grieve
Smith, Managing Exchange Rates, FIN. TIMES, Oct.7, 1998, at 18 (arguing for
specific remedies to currency instability), Craig R. Whitney, Germany's New
Leader Gives France Reassurances About Ties, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1998, at A 17
(reporting on the German-French agreement regarding the need for regulation of
global capital flows).
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have had little success with the Clinton administration, 7' and elicited
the outright hostility of central bankers.0'
In order to reform the global financial system to restore stability in
exchange rates, a return to some kind of regime of limited use of
controls or restrictions on short-term capital inflows is needed. This
would entail a reorientation of IMF policy, one that may already be
in its infancy. During some of the worst months of the global cur-
rency contagion, many internationalists came to appreciate the kinds
of prudential controls on short-term capital inflows that Chile
adopted several years ago. - 9 For instance, a foreign investor who
wanted to invest or lend within Chile, was required to deposit 30% of
such investment or loan into a non-interest bearing account with the
central bank for a full year or pay a 3% tax to recover that deposit.10
These prudential limits, known locally as the encaje, had the effect
of cutting down the incentive for short-term borrowing from abroad,
and thereby reduced Chile's reliance on short-term capital inflows.'"
2M It is uncertain whether the Bush administration was moving in the direction of
more stability in exchange rates. See Bush: Overhaul Currency Valuation,
NEWSDAY, Sept. 21, 1992, at 21.
See Wolfgang Munchau & Tony Barber, Central Bank Chiefs Dismiss Calls
For Exchange Rate Targets, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1998, at 1.
2 See Felix supra note 142 and accompanying text.
210 In the summer of 1998, Chile relaxed its capital restrictions under strong politi-
cal pressure from foreign investors. See Craig Torres, Chilean Bid to Boost Con-
fidence Lauded: Stocks Climnb on Plan to Ease Curbs on Foreign Investors, WALL
ST. J., June 29, 1998, at A14; see also Imogen Mark, Chile may ease capital in-
flow rule to lift peso, FIN. TIMES, June 26, 1998, at 8; Greider, supra note 24, at
319, 490. Not surprisingly, within a year of liffing its capital restrictions, Chile
experienced a weakening currency, economic recession, and a sharply rising un-
employment rate. See Clifford Krauss, Chile: Cabinet Quits, N.Y TIMES, June 22,
1999, at A8; see also Clifford Krauss, Chile Leader Moves to Aid His Economy,
And Prestige, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1999, at A5 (reporting that in the past year,
Chile's unemployment rate rose from 5% to 8.2%, as 140,000 workers lost their
jobs).
21, See Ricardo Ffrench-Davis et al., Capital Movements, Erport Strategy, and
Macroeconomic Stability in Chile, in COPING WITH CAPITAL SURGES: THE
RETURN OF FINANCE TO LATIN AMERICA 99, 136-37 (Ffrench-Davis and S.
Griffith-Jones eds., 1995) (examining the short-term flow of capital in Chile); see
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In mid-1998, a high-level defection shook the established eco-
nomic orthodoxy when MIT economist and free-trader Paul Krug-
man suddenly came out in favor of capital and exchange controls.
Krugman did not just publicly support controls on capital inflows,
but rather he advocated the more pervasive and intrusive controls
that Malaysia had recently adopted to control exchange operations,
current transactions and capital outflows. 2 2 The highly visible and
respected Krugman is now supporting currency and capital controls
that are much more pervasive than many critics of the neoliberal
contagion previously dared to advocate.1
B. RESTRICTIONS ON SHORT-TERM CAPITAL INFLOWS
Throughout much of the past year, a covert discussion has taken
place in financial circles about capital controls. Joseph Stiglitz, the
chief economist of The World Bank, has consistently endorsed
"speed bumps" to slow down the pace of global financial specula-
tion, and has expressed his sympathy for the Chilean program.1 4 Sti-
also Carlos Massad, The Liberalization of the Capital Account: Chile in the
1990's, in SHOULD THE IMF PURSUE CAPITAL-ACCOUNT CONTROVERTIBILITY?,
ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCE (R. Cooper ed., 1998) (presenting arguments
for and against capital controls in Chile and evaluating their successes and fail-
ures); Chile's Experience with Capital Controls, in ANNUAL REPORT 1998, 176
(International Monetary Fund, 1998).
2"2 See Krugman, supra note 114, at 78-80; see also Paul Krugman, An Open Let-
ter to Prime Minister Mahathir (last modified Sept. 1, 1998) <http://web.mit.
edu/krugman/www/mahathir.html> (arguing in favor of capital and exchange
controls to promote "a recovery of the real economy").
213 In light of Krugman's sudden about-face on capital and exchange controls and
his late recognition of the Asian glut, one might expect him to issue an apology
for his earlier criticisms of Greider. See PAUL KRUGMAN, THE ACCIDENTAL
THEORIST 32, 74, 76 (1998).
24 See Comment and Analysis, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1998, at 17; Joseph E. Sti-
glitz, Using Tax Policy To Curb Speculative Short-Term Trading, 3 J. FIN.
SERVICES RES. 3 (1989) (arguing in favor of the use of tax policy to increase eco-
nomic efficiency); see also Paul Krugman, Curfews on Capital Flight: What Are
the Options? (visited June 12, 1999) <http://www.web.mit.edu/krugman/www
/curfews.html> (discussing "cooling-off' periods for capital flight).
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glitz pointed to a study showing no correlation between capital ac-
count liberalization and economic growth, and suggested that mild
restraints on capital flows might help economic growth.2" In early
February 1998, Stanley Fischer, the JIMF's first deputy managing di-
rector, recognized the need to find ways to deal with the problem of
surges of short-term capital across borders. ' 6 Fischer suggested that
the Chilean scheme was one that needed to be considered.217 More
recently, in September 1998, the IMF's Asia-Pacific Director, Hubert
Neiss, indicated that short-term capital controls may be needed to
curb the spread of the currency contagion. '8 Later that same month,
the IMF declared that controls on inward movements of capital could
provide a useful tool for some countries, and that opening economies
prematurely to free flows of capital constituted "an accident waiting
to happen."' 19
25 See Joseph Stiglitz, The Role of the Financial System in Development, Presen-
tation at the Fourth Annual Bank Conference on Development in Latin America
and the Caribbean, San Salvador, El Salvador, (visited June 29, 1998)
<http://www.worldbank.orghtmllextdr/extme/jssp062998.htm>; see also Joseph
Stiglitz, Road to Recovery: Restoring growth in a region could be a long and dif-
ficult process, ASIAWEEK, July 17, 1998 reprinted at
<http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/extme/jsart-wO71798.html> (visited June
12, 1999); James Wilson, Delegates agree the state has a role to play in theft-
nancial sector-but what is it?: FIN. TIMES, July 1, 1998, at 6.
216 See Louis Uchitelle, I.M.F. May Be Closer To Lending-Curb Idea, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 3, 1998, atD1.
27 See id at DI.
218 See Bill Tarrant, I.M.F. sees short-term capital controls in Asia, REUTERS,
Sept. 14, 1998; see also IMF Moots Capital Controls For Asia, BUS. DAY (S.
AFRICA), Sept. 15, 1998, at 14.
2'9 See Stephen Fidler, IMF admits drawbacks to free flow of capital, FIN. TIMES,
Sept. 22, 1998, at 9. Former Treasury Secretary Rubin criticized Chilean-style
taxes on short-term capital inflows as difficult to administer over time. Rubin
demonstrated a preference for capital account liberalization and IMF-sanctioned
austerity for deficit countries when he warned that the Chilean-type program must
not be a substitute for "fundamental reform to strengthen and liberalize financial
systems." See Robert E. Rubin, Remarks on Reform of the International Financial
Architecture to the School of Advance International Studies, TREASURY NEWS,
Apr. 21, 1999, reprinted at <http://vww.ustreas.gov/pressreleaseslpr3093.htm>
(visited June 12, 1999).
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Yet, it seems that each time a crack appears in the official ortho-
doxy, the transgressors or their allies at the IMF, Treasury, or else-
where quickly backpedal or even retract their earlier expressions of
misgivings about the dangerous direction of today's neoliberal poli-
cies.2 One is tempted to conclude that the prior confessions were
made in unguarded moments, under the weight of conscience, only to
be retracted when, once again, one imagines the dangers of express-
ing the truth and the potential loss of "credibility" in the eyes of the
established powers that profit by today's hot money regime.' The
accepted orthodoxy, it seems, must be maintained at all costs, even if
an urgently needed debate is delayed, and therefore denied, and
poorly conceived policies continue to impose suffering around the
world.
222
There is, however, a very real and growing split within the world
of finance concerning the pace and degree of financial liberalization
and the use of temporary controls and prudential restrictions on the
2'0 See Michel Camdessus, Capital Account Liberalization and the Role of the
Fund, Remarks at the IMF Seminar (Mar. 9, 1998), reprinted at
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/1998/030998.htm> (visited June 12,
1999) (restating the IMF's views on capital account liberalization); see also
Nancy Dunne, Summers Sees IMF Dealing With Global Crisis, FIN. TIMES, Oct.
23, 1998, at 6. Lawrence Summers, United States Treasury Secretary, has become
one of the Clinton administration's chief cheerleaders of capital account liberali-
zation, despite the fact that he supported taxes on financial transactions prior to
his tenure in government. See generally Lawrence H. Summers & Victoria P.
Summers, When Financial Markets Work Too Well: A Cautious Case for a Secu-
rities Transactions Tax, 3 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 163 (1989).
221 For an example of such "strategic positioning," see Enrique R. Carrasco, Oppo-
sition, Justice, Structuralism, and Particularity: Intersections Between LatCrit
Theory and Law and Development Studies, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 313,
328-29 (1996-97) (arguing that LatCrits should cautiously support the neoliberal
policies of the IMF and World Bank if those LatCrits want policymakers to take
their work seriously).
222 See JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 11 (1958) (stating
that "the hallmark of the conventional wisdom is acceptability"); see also Stiglitz,
supra note 48 (remarking "all too often the dogma of liberalization became an
end in itself, not a means of achieving a better financial system").
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flow of short-term hot money.-" This split is increasingly pushed un-
derground at a time when resurrection of serious discussion is most
needed. This covert debate is currently being played out around the
globe in the context of the global contagion and increasingly desper-
ate economic and financial conditions.
In the fall of 1998, Mexican President Zedillo publicly rejected the
option of capital controls.' 4 Although that option is taboo in the pre-
sent political environment, such proposals will probably resurface if
the currency contagion continues to deepen and spread to Mexico."
This raises the question of NAFTA's compatibility with controls on
capital flows between Mexico and the United States. NAFTA's Arti-
cle 2104 would permit restrictions on capital transactions if Mexico
experienced serious balance of payment problems. According to Ar-
ticle 2104(5), however, Mexico could impose such restrictions "only
in conjunction with measures imposed on current international trans-
actions."' 6 The practical effect of this wording is that Mexico must
submit to the IMF's surveillance under Article VIII of the IMF's Ar-
ticles. ' ' That, of course, is only a prescription for continued eco-
nomic austerity.
See Michael M. Weinstein, The Markets: Economic Scene; Twisting Controls
on Currency and Capital, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1998, at CI; see also John Plen-
der, Taming wild money: Risk-taking banks have intensified economic cycles, FIN.
TIMES, Oct. 20, 1998, at 21.
224See Richard Lapper, Zedillo warns against protectionist pressures, FIN. TIMES,
Oct. 15, 1998, at 6 (reporting that Zedillo claimed that capital controls were
doomed to fail). That was not the first time that Yale-educated Zedillo has re-
jected controls on speculative capital flows. See GREIDER, supra note 24, at 263.
225 Mexico has suffered financial crises during each presidential transition since
1976. The IMF hopes to prevent such a recurrence during the 2000 presidential
election by adding a $4.2 billion credit to Mexico's reserves. See Rick Wills, IWlorld
Business Briefing: Americas; LM.F. Loan Approved, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1999, at
C3.
n6See NAFTA, supra note 63, at art. 2104(5).
227 See id. at art. 2104(5) (referring to Article 2104(2)(a), which requires IMF Ar-
ticle VIII review and, therefore, approval of any currency account exchange re-
strictions).
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In the alternative, Mexico could invoke NAFTA Article 1410,
which permits reasonable measures for prudential reasons such as the
maintenance of safety, soundness, and integrity of the financial in-
stitutions, and the integrity of the financial system.228 Therefore, it
seems clear that under NAFTA, Mexico could legally impose Chil-
ean-style prudential reserve requirements on short-term capital in-
flows without swallowing the bitter IMF austerity pill.
In recent years, quite a number of countries have experimented
with various programs of capital restrictions with varying degrees of
success. 229 In fact, Chile's encaje program by no means represented
the most restrictive. The Chilean program probably received a great
deal of enthusiastic attention because of its relatively modest ap-
proach of using the tax system to decrease the financial incentive for
short-term portfolio inflows. Other countries such as China and India
have remained somewhat sheltered from the currency contagion be-
cause of their more restrictive programs of exchange controls on
capital (both inflows and outflows) and currency transactions."230 Yet,
the IMF still ignores the lessons of such success stories.23" '
Also in the fall of 1998, Brazil imposed some restrictions on short-
term capital inflows in response to an increase in capital outflows
228 See id., at art. 1410(1).
221 See FOLKERTS-LANDAU & ITO, supra note 2, at 83, 97, 100-103 (describing
various programs of capital controls, prudential restrictions, and alterations in re-
serve requirements in six countries, including Chile).
230 See Peter Passell, China's stable currency is protecting it for now, N.Y. TIMES,
June 25, 1998, at D2 (asserting that China seems like an "island of stability" in
the Asian financial turmoil because of its exchange controls); see also GREIDER,
supra note 24, at 319, Craig S. Smith, China Can Spur Growth Without a De-
valuation, WALL ST. J., June 22, 1998, at Al (controls permit China to limit
trading in its currency, the yuan, to a "narrow, tightly controlled range").
2' See Kenneth Kasa, Could Russia Have Learned from China?, Fed. Reserve
Bank of San Francisco Economic Letter, No. 98-26 (Sept. 4, 1998). The IMF
shows no recognition that the most important lesson that Russia should have
learned from China's success is to go slower on capital account liberalization. See
Zuliu Hu & Mohsin S. Khan, Why Is China Growing So Fast?, ECON. ISSUES
(International Monetary Fund, 1997) at 8.
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stemming from the global currency contagion.2"' This presented a
sharp reversal from Brazil's prior policy. In November 1997, at the
peak of the Asian currency crisis, and in keeping with the IMF and
United States agenda for capital account liberalization, Brazil opened
loopholes to attract capital inflows into short-term debt instru-
ments. '3 As a result, Brazil's inflows of hot money soared, leaving
the country "vulnerable to investor mood swings."2 4 The horse was
apparently already out of the barn, and Brazil was already too ad-
dicted to short-term capital inflows for prudential restrictions on such
inflows to be of much help.25
This is the danger of waiting until the wolf is already at the door.2
The cost of delay may be the kind of full-blown financial crises that
we have seen in Russia and throughout parts of East Asia. For exam-
ple, Malaysia adopted exchange restrictions on capital inflows, capi-
tal outflows, and current transactions that persuasively surpassed any
of the prudential restrictions that Chile ever imposed.2'- Yet, Malay-
232 See Geogg Dyer, Brazil to curb short-term capital inflows, FIN. TIMES, Sept.
30, 1998, at 3 (quoting Francisco Lopes, director for monetary policy of Brazil's
central bank, as saying, "One important lesson of the crisis is that you take a lot of
risks with large short-term capital inflows").
73 See id.
2m See id.
.. See Geoff Dryer, Capital Controls for Brazil Rejected, FIN. TIMES, Jan.
27,1999, at 3; see also Larry Rohter, Brazil Devahtes Its Currency 8%, Roiling
Markets: Wider Effect Seen, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1998, at Al.
" Japan's recent attempt to protect its currency with increased controls elicited
strong political opposition from the international investment community. See Paul
Abrahams & Gillian Tett, Tokyo to curb short selling to counter market decline,
FIN. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1998, at 1; see also Gillian Tett & Michiyo Nakamoto, Ja-
pan's politicians step on stage with hedge finds in their sights, FIN. TIMES, Oct.
28, 1998, at 4; Jane Martinson, Hedge funds unnerved by short-selling rides, FIN.
TIMES, Oct. 23, 1998, at 6; Gillian Tett, Anger over Japan 's new curbs on short
selling, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1998, at 18.
217 See Malaysia Imposes Controls On Trading in Its Currency, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
2, 1998, at C2; see also Bank Negara Malaysia Press Release: Details on
Changes in Exchange Control Mechanism (visited June 5, 1999)
http://wwv.jaring.my/starAVednesday/ecmnotic.html> (describing dealings with
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sia appears to be using the breathing space provided by its exchange
controls to boost domestic demand and slowly bring back foreign in-
238vestors. Proponents of capital account liberalization fear that Ma-
laysia may succeed in its program, at least relative to other Asian
countries, and might then present a viable alternative to the IMF
model.239
The situation is even more severe in Russia where the government,
on the brink of default, was forced to call a temporary halt in trading
of its currency in the foreign exchange markets and a moratorium on
debt repayments.240 The Russian financial meltdown severely im-
pacted its economy, and threatens the country's political reforms.14 , It
gold and foreign currency); see generally Mahathir Mohamad, Call Me a Heretic
If You Like, TIME, Sept. 21, 1998, at 80 (Malaysian Prime Minister's express and
open defiance of the financial orthodoxy).
2. See Charles Chan, Trade Surpluses Strong Signs of an Improving Economy,
MALAYSIAN STAR, Feb. 11, 1999 (noting that Malaysia's economy is improving);
see also Wang Sulang, November 1998 Trade Figures Bring More Good News,
MALAYSIAN STAR, Jan. 6, 1999; Edward Luce, Tokyo Backs Malaysian Bond Is-
sue, FIN. TIMES, Dec.11, 1998, at 8; T.J. Tan, Malaysia to Borrow from Consor-
tium of Foreign Banks, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1998, at 4; Sheila McNutty, Malay-
sia bank chiefs face sack unless they lend, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 14-15, 1998, at 4.
2
1
9 See G. Pierre Goad, Acceptance of Capital Controls is Spreading, ASIAN WALL
ST. J., Sept. 2, 1998, at 1 (noting that Malaysia's decision to impose controls vio-
lates economic orthodoxy); David E. Sanger, Malaysia Pushes Economic
Grouping of Asian Nations, MPLS.-ST. PAUL STAR TRIB., Apr. 7, 1991, at 3J (re-
porting that Malaysia is trying to organize Asian nations into economic group);
see generally Alan Cowell, U.N. Seeks Social Compact with Big Business, SAN
DIEGO UNION & TRIB., Feb. 1, 1999, at A8; David E. Sanger, Asia's Economic
Tigers Growl at World Monetary Conference: Say Opening of Markets Hands
Wall Street too much Power, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1997, at Al.
24
1 See Michael Gordon, Russians Say Loan By IMF. May Fall Short of the Need,
N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1998, at Al; see also Celestine Bohlen, "Ruble Rescue Re-
dux," N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1998, at A6; Celestine Bohlen, "Russia Warns it
Might Default if Western Aid is Withheld," N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1998, at A 10;
"Russia: Currency Controls Tightened," N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1999, at A6.
241 See Timothy L. O'Brien, Horrific Debt, Devastated Economy, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 15, 1998, at A12; see also Grigory Yavlinsky, Russia's Phony Capitalism,
77 FOREIGN AFF. 67 (1998); Michael Wines, Russia 's New Leaders Plan to Pay
Debt by Printing Money, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1998, at A3.
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is particularly tragic that at least some of these dire consequences
could have been avoided had there been greater use of prudential re-
strictions on short-term capital inflows.
Such restrictions on hot money capital flows, however, should be
seen as necessary, but not sufficient to accomplish the objectives of
sustainable economic development. Even if less vulnerable to the
dangers of hot money flight, developing countries would still be con-
fronted with the challenge of obtaining long-term assistance to fi-
nance their development efforts. 42 In addition, the leading industrial
countries would still need to end the deflationary biases and tenden-
241cies of the global economy.
C. PROPOSALS FOR A FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS TURNOVER TAX
Among the compelling reform proposals that have been raised is
the so-called Tobin Tax, first proposed by the Nobel-laureate
economist, James Tobin.244 It would impose a turnover tax on foreign
exchange transactions, an entry-and-exit toll that would be a very
small percentage of the transaction, but enough to deter over-
242 Proposals to meet the requirements of long-term development assistance include
increasing allocations of Special Drawing Rights, using revenues from a global fi-
nancial transactions tax, and low-interest or no interest recycling of reserves from
surplus to deficit countries. See infra notes 249-272, 282-87 and accompanying
text.
243 Proposals to correct the global economy's deflationary biases and tendencies in-
clude relaxing the IMF's severe conditionality requirements, redistributing the
burdens of adjustment from deficit to surplus countries, and reducing reliance on
monetary policy to maintain domestic price stability and currency stability. See su-
pra notes 203-204 and accompanying text; see also infra 273-296 and accompa-
nying text.
244 For Tobin's original proposal, see JAMES TOBIN, THE NEW ECONOMICS ONE
DECADE OLDER, THE JANE WAY LECTURES ON HISTORICAL ECONOMICS (Princeton
Univ. Press 1974) (setting forth the original proposal); see also John Maynard
Keynes, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY 159-
160 (1964 ed.). "The introduction of a substantial Government transfer tax on all
[financial] transactions might prove the most serviceable reform available, with a
view to mitigating the predominance of speculation over enterprise." see id.
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speculation.245 As Tobin said, such a tax would "throw sand in the
gears of the speculators."
2 46
Unfortunately, policymakers have largely overlooked Tobin's pro-
posal while accepting more recent Nobel-laureates whose work has
concentrated on undermining financial market stability and the eco-
nomic planning capabilities of governments by developing increasingly
241intricate financial derivative instruments. Many critics of the Tobin
Tax proposal claim that such a tax is unenforceable because of the
ever-present incentives to try to evade taxes.248 If the objectives are
compelling enough, however, there is no reason that such a program
should not elicit wide international support and cooperation, and be
effectively implemented, as was the Basle Accord on international
211 See James Tobin, A Proposal for International Monetary Reform, Presidential
Address before the Eastern Economic Association, 1978 EASTERN ECON. J. 153;
see also Robert E. Prasch, THE TOBIN TAX: COPING WITH FINANCIAL VOLATILITY
(Mahbub U1 Haq ed., 1996) (stating that Tobin was awarded the Nobel Prize in
Economics in 1981); AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS 605 (T. Cate
ed., 1997).
24. See Barry Eichengreen et al., Two Cases for Sand in the Wheels of Interna-
tional Finance, 105 ECON. JOURNAL 162-72 (1995). But see Paul Davidson, Are
Grains of Sand in the Wheels of International Finance Sufficient to do the Job
When Boulders are often Required?, 107 ECON. J. 671-86 (1997); Jacob A.
Frenkel, Symposium, Overview, CHANGING CAPITAL MARKETS: IMPLICATIONS
FOR MONETARY POLICY 394 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 1993). A well-
designed financial transaction tax could achieve several objectives, including re-
ducing speculative capital flows and raising significant revenue. See Simon Ro-
mero, Brazil Ousts Bank Board That Opposed Tax, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1999 at
C4. Brazilian President Feranando Henrique Cardoso dismissed the board of one
of the largest government controlled banks after it sought a court order to free it-
self from paying a 0.38% tax on financial transactions that is expected to raise
about $3.9 billion, and is considered essential in containing the nation's budget
deficit. See id.
2147 Two such Nobel-laureates that helped drive Long-Term Capital Management
hedge fund into the ground are Myron Scholes and Robert Merton; see Truell, su-
pra note 40; see also Timothy L. O'Brien & Laura M. Holson, Hedge Fund's Star
Power Lulled Big Financiers Into Complacency, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1998, at A l.
248 See FOLKERTS-LANDAU & ITO, supra note 2, at 98-99.
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capital standards among the ten leading central banks. ' " Most of the
world's foreign exchange transactions take place in only five coun-
tries.u° Effective implementation would require the support of those
five major players and a commitment to keep "off-shore," unregu-
lated jurisdictions from using the international financial payments
system to undermine the tax program. In addition, the same technol-
ogy that speculators would use to try to evade a Tobin Tax could also
be used to enforce such a tax program.2'-
The Tobin Tax is another issue where European leaders are far
ahead of United States political leaders.z-2 In March 1999, the Cana-
dian Parliament voted to endorse an international tax on financial
transactions as part of a program to control currency speculation,
249 See SOLOMON, supra note 147, at 414-35; see also Philip Arestis & Malcolm
Sawyer, How Many Cheers for the Tobin Transactions Tar?, 21 CAMBRIDGE 1.
ECON. 753-68 (1997); MCQUAIG, supra note 166, at 267-71.
2o See GREIDER, supra note 24, at 234, 319 (stating that the most important for-
eign exchange markets in the world are London, New York, Frankfurt, Tokyo,
and Hong Kong).
2" See David Bollier, Reporter, The Global Advance of Electronic Commerce:
Reinventing Markets, Management, and National Sovereignty 46-47 (The Aspen
Institute, Washington, D.C., 1998); see also Rodney Schmidt, A Feasible Foreign
Exchange Transactions Tax, Ottawa: North-South Institute (March, 1999) (ex-
plaining that all international financial transfers are transacted through Fedwire,
CHIPS, or SWIFT, three United States-based clearing systems); Gerard Wyrsch,
Treasuiy Regulation of International Wire Transfer and Money Laundering: A
Case for a Permanent Moratorium, 20 DENV. J. INT'L L.& POL'Y 515, 517-21
(1992); Stephen Zamora, Remarks, 86 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 188, 201-04
(1992) (stating that "[i]f the world community adopts a closed-circuit system, it
will be essential to enter that system in order to take part in the western financial
system"). Every computer message or connection linked to the Internet can be
identified and traced through a unique code called the Internet protocol address.
Such computerized coding should be applied to transnational financial transac-
tions. See William M. Bulkeley, Arrests Made in Internet Hoar, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 16, 1999, at Cl; Edward Wyatt, Fake Web Posting Leads to Fraud Charge,
N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 16, 1999, at C1 (reporting that swift tracing of securities fraud
suspect in fake posting on Internet demonstrates how difficult it is to venture into
cyberspace without leaving footprints).
2'2 See Barbara Crossette, As World Leaders Coiqfer on Pol'ery" Mitterand Urges
New Tax, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 12, 1995, at 4.
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making Canada the first G-7 government to endorse formally, though
largely symbolically, such a currency transaction tax.2'"
There are also reasons related to distributional equity to impose
such a tax on financial transactions. Presently, in the United States
there is a sizable tax on labor, the Social Security tax, which levies a
combined tax of 12.4% on employers and employees."4 There is, how-
ever, no comparable tax on capital flows. In its most recent tri-annual
Survey of Consumer Finance, the Federal Reserve concluded that the
top 1% of United States households now controls more wealth than the
bottom 90%.211 It is time for investors who have done quite well earn-
ing double digit returns in the global financial marketplace to get out of
the wagon and push their own weight. 56
Many of today's free-market cheerleaders criticize the Tobin Tax
and other prudential restrictions on short-term portfolio capital flows
by claiming that such solutions would prevent countries like Mexico
and other emerging markets from getting the capital that they need
253 See Donna Green, A Money Grab, CANADIAN Bus., Apr. 30, 1999, at 20 (not-
ing Canada's endorsement of the Tobin Tax); see also Shawn McCarthy, Liberals
Vote in Favour of Currency Transaction Tax, GLOBE & MAIL, Mar. 25, 1999, at
B5.
'14 See Henning Bonh, Social Security Reform and Financial Markets, in SOCIAL
SECURITY REFORM: CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 197 (S. Sass, R. Triest, eds., June
1997) (stating that the combined employer and employee contributions to Social
Security's Old Age, Survivors Insurance, and Disability Insurance Funds amounts
to 12.4% of covered payroll).
... See Arthur B. Kennickell et al., Family Finances in the U.S.: Recent Evidence
from the Survey of Consumer Finances, 83 FED. RESERVE BULL. 21, at tbl. 14
(Jan. 1997); Arthur B. Kennickell & R. Louise Woodburn, Consistent Weight De-
sign for the 1989, 1992, and 1995 SCFs, and the Distribution of Wealth, 30, at tbl.
9 (unpublished Fed. Reserve technical paper, revised Aug. 1997); DOUG
HENWOOD, WALL STREET 66-67 (1997) (stating that "[w]ealth is now the most
concentrated it's been since the 1920s").
2,6 Senator Phil Gramm is usually credited with popularizing the metaphor of the
welfare wagon, but by welfare he refers to entitlements for the poor, not legal rules
that benefit those with wealth. See Robert L. Borasage, Take From The Poor, Give
to the Rich, L.A. TIMES, June 26, 1997, at B9.
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for development!" However, it has been estimated that a Tobin Tax
of only 1% on foreign exchange transactions could raise more than
$700 billion annually, even after accounting for reduced trading vol-
ume and exemptions to finance the actual sale of real goods and
services.28 Many things could be done with the significant sums of
money that would be raised with a financial turnover tax, including a
healthy increase in long-term development assistance to developing
countries.
D. INCREASING GLOBAL LIQUIDITY WITH SPECIAL
DRAWING RIGHTS
Back in 1994, before the Mexican peso meltdown and the start of
the global currency contagion, the Managing Director of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, Michel Camdessus, proposed increasing
"Special Drawing Rights," by $52 billion.29 The Special Drawing
Right ("SDR"), also known as "paper gold," is a global currency that
was created by the IMF, first issued in 1970, and used as a reserve
asset.26
Supporters of the Camdessus proposal recognized that the for-
merly communist and other poor countries never received any initial
allocation of SDRs.' It should be no surprise that many of those
2" See The Case for Global Finance, ECONOMIST, Sept. 12, 1998, at 19-20
(warning that controls would encourage capital flight); see also David R.
Henderson, Let Capital Flow Freely, WALL ST. J., Sept. 10, 1998, at A22 (as-
serting that capital controls drastically reduce the incentive for private foreign in-
vestment).
2" See David Felix, The Tobin Tax Proposal: Background, Issues and Prospects
13 (United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Social Development Pol-
icy Paper, Mar. 1995).
2'9 See Paul Lewis, Rich and Poor Nations Split on Aid Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3,
1994, at D l, D2.
2
60 See DETLEV F. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS PROBLEMS 98 (1998) (ex-
plaining that SDRs were first established by an amendment to the IMF Articles
of Agreement that went into effect in 1970, but only about S28 billion in SDRs
have ever been created).
76' See Lewis, supra note 259.
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countries now lack the reserves with which to fend off speculative
attacks against their currencies. Unfortunately, the Camdessus pro-
posal was rejected, and Camdessus was reportedly "roundly criti-
cized by the United States, Germany and Britain, which accused him
of empire-building.
262
It may, however, be more accurate to describe the Camdessus pro-
posal as a failed attempt at empire-breaking, or at least to undermine
the dominance of the United States dollar and several other major
currencies. There is reason to conclude that the global monetary
system favors First World surplus and creditor countries, as well as
the United States, a chronic deficit country263 that does not operate
under the same constraints as most other deficit countries since its
own currency,2'6 the United States dollar, is the major reserve cur-
rency in the world.
According to a 1991 report by the BIS, capital flows tend to exag-
gerate trade imbalances.265 The United States and other major indus-
262 See Jeff Gerth & Elaine Sciolino, LM.F. Head: He Speaks, and Money Talks,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1996, at Al; see also Peter Passell, Economic Scene: An
Old Idea is Dusted Off to Aid Russia: Special Drawing Rights, N.Y. TIMES, July
7,1994, at D2 (reporting that Camdessus wanted to create SDRs to cover 10% of
the total growth in demand for financial liquidity).
263 See Sylvia Nasar, Trade Deficit Rises, Setting Record Early, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
22, 1999, at C1 (explaining that the United States trade deficit widened sharply
in November); see also Mark Suzman, Imports Push U.S. Trade Gap to Record
$19.4bn, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1999, at 1 (stating that United States monthly
trade deficit hit a new high).
164 Even huge and growing United States trade and current account deficits are
not able to undermine the high value of the United States dollar, which remains a
safe haven during global financial and/or economic turmoil. See Paul Lewis,
U.S. Said to Face Brunt of Economic Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1998, at A8.
261 See Philip Turner, Capital Flows in the 1980s: A Survey of Major Trends,
(BIS Economic Papers, No. 30, Apr. 1991). Many theoretical and empirical eco-
nomic studies suggest that trade and economic liberalization actually undermines
the terms of trade of developing countries. But the IMF and World Bank solution
to the resulting balance-of-payments difficulties is another dose of bad medicine,
i.e., more liberalization is demanded through the IMF and World Bank's Struc-
tural Adjustment Lending Programs. See Michael Bleaney, Liberalisation and
the Terms of Trade of Developing Countries: A Cause For Concern? 16:4
WORLD ECON. 453, 464 (July 1993). "If this analysis is correct then structural
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trialized countries may perversely benefit as safe havens for capital
fleeing from other countries that are experiencing extreme and acute
financial and economic hardship. In contrast, deficit countries typi-
cally face capital outflows, as capital tries to beat, and thereby con-
tributes to, a coming devaluation.266 Attempts by developing coun-
tries to defend the value of their currencies with higher interest rates
also contribute to larger trade and budget deficits,26 ' thereby leaving
those developing countries more dependent on hot money inflows.
The Camdessus proposal did not represent the first time that the
IF attempted to increase the allocation of SDR's. In the 1970s, Mr.
J. de Larosiere, the IMF's previous managing director, supported
such proposals. 26' Developing nations also called for increased SDR
allocations as part of their demands for a New International Eco-
nomic Order ("NIEO") in the context of the so-called North-South
dialogue.269
Nevertheless, there has been no increase in the allocation of SDRs
for nearly eighteen years.270 Many of the countries that never received
changes in the trade policy of developed countries will do little to solve the
problem, and help would have to take the form of a direct alleviation of balance
of payments constraints through flows of aid." Id.
266United States interest rates may be lower than rates elsewhere because of such
inflows of frightened capital. See Turner, supra note 265 and accompanying
text; see also HENWOOD, supra note 255, at 108; ROBERT SOLOMON, MONEY ON
THE MOVE 93 (1999).
267 See Sachs & Radelet, supra note 119, at A25; see generally Canova & Tur-
geon, supra note 153 and accompanying text.
2" See MARGARET GARRfTSEN DE VRIES, BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ADJUSTMENT,
1945 TO 1986: THE IMF EXPERIENCE 146, 175, 288-89 (1987) (discussing IMF
policy).
269 See North-South: A Programme For Survival, Report of the Independent
Commission on International Development Issues (1980) at 211-212; see also
ROBERT L. ROTHSTEIN, GLOBAL BARGAINING: UNCTAD AND THE QUEST FOR A
NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 162 (1979); see generally John Wil-
liamson, A NEW SDR ALLOCATION? 34 (1984).
270See Special Drawing Rights, Survey Supplement on the Fund 1996, (visited
June 11, 1999) <http://www.imf.orglextemal/pubsiftisurvey/sup0996!
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an SDR allocation now find themselves without sufficient reserves to
fend off financial speculation. 7' Other developing countries that re-
ceived SDR allocations many years ago have been harmed by the
way the global financial system unfairly punishes developing coun-
272tries that are experiencing trade and/or budget deficits.
E. CHANGING THE BURDENS OF ADJUSTMENT:
RECYCLING THE SURPLUSES
When trade between nations remains chronically unbalanced, defi-
cit and/or surplus nations must make adjustments. 73 Another ap-
proach to the problem of providing sufficient long-term development
capital would attempt to place the burden of adjustment on surplus
countries by requiring them to recycle their reserves at low or no in-
terest to deficit countries.274
1 Osdr.html.> (reporting that the last allocation was on January 1, 1981, when
only SDR 4.1 billion was allocated).
27 In a particularly shortsighted stance, the United States Treasury Department
opposes offering Russia any new IMF resources. See David E. Sanger, LMF.
Relents on Aid to Russia, but U.S. Talks Tougher, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1999, at
A6.
272 While each member country was originally allocated SDRs in proportion to its
IMF quota (i.e., contribution), the IMF has discretionary power to expand the
size of SDR allocations. See VAGTS, supra note 260, at 98, Francis Stewart,
Back to Keynesianism: Reforming the IMF, IV WORLD POL'Y J. 465, 477
(1987).
273 See Geoffrey Gilbert, International Clearing Union, in AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS 256, 257 (T. Cate ed., 1997).
274 See Robert Chote, G7 Urged to Find Extra Cash for Debt Relief, FIN. TIMES,
Apr. 29, 1999, at 7 (explaining that debt relief could be part of a strategy to recycle
surpluses and relieve some of the burden of adjustment from deficit countries). Un-
fortunately, debt relief plans usually apply only to the poorest of countries and
even then the levels of relief are insufficient to alter the direction of adjustment
burdens. See Paul Lewis, I.M.F. and World Bank Clear Debt Relief, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 30, 1996, at C2; see also Jeffrey D. Sachs, A Millennial Gift to Developing
Nations, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1999, at A31 (endorsing Jubilee 2000, an interna-
tional movement calling for the cancellation of the unpayable debt of the poorest
nations); see generally Jubilee 2000 Convention (visited July 6, 1999)
<http:www.jubilee2000uk.org/main.html>; Leviticus 25:8-12, 25-55; Deuteron-
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In the months leading up to the 1944 Bretton Woods conference,
Keynes offered a proposal for an International Clearing Union that
would assess an interest charge on excess reserves above a country's
quota.2 5 This, he believed, would remedy the defects in the pre-war
adjustment mechanism that put an unequal burden of adjustment on
deficit countries, thereby undermining economic activity and world
commerce.276 Keynes claimed that the International Clearing Union
plan would pressure adjustment on "any country whose balance of
payments with the rest of the world is departing from equilibrium in
either direction."2"
The Bretton Woods Conference rejected Keynes's proposal in fa-
vor of the United States' plan for the IMIF, which lacked an explicit
mechanism for assessing charges against chronic surplus countries.'
While the Articles do contain a "scarce currency clause" to shift
some burden of adjustment on surplus countries, the IMF has largely
ignored that provision.279
Throughout its existence, the IMF has consistently demonstrated a
bias that places the complete burden of adjustment on deficit coun-
tries.28 0 When a country's balance of payments is chronically in defi-
omy 15:1-12 on the biblical origins of the concept of sabbatical and jubilee years
to prevent the growth of economic classes and forgive debts after specified time
periods.
2- See Gilbert, supra note 273, at 257; see also James Crotty, On Keynes and
Capital Flight, 21 J. ECON. LITERATURE 59, 62-63 (1983).
276 See Robert Skidelsky, Keynes's New Order: The Genesis of the Clearing Un-
ion, Paper Presented at Post-Keynesian Workshop Conference, Tennessee, June
26 - July 1, 1998, at 20-26 (draft on file with author).
2n See Gilbert, supra note 273, at 258.
27 See id. (stating that it was not surprising that the American plan prevailed or
that it favored surplus countries, given the fact that the United States was a sur-
plus country at the time, and enjoyed a "commanding political and economic po-
sition").
2 See infra notes 298-301 and accompanying text.
noSee North-South, supra note 269, at 213-14.
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cit and its reserves are declining, IMF consultations result in a classic
austerity program under which the deficit country deflates its econ-
omy by raising interest rates, constraining the growth of the money
supply, cutting back on government spending, and raising taxes. As
the deficit country falls into recession, its citizens simply lose the
means to continue to demand imports from the rest of the world. If
the burdens of adjustment were distributed in a more equitable man-
ner, then chronic surplus countries would be compelled to inflate
their economies, import more goods and services from the deficit
world, and/or recycle their surpluses through long-term foreign in-
vestment and grants. Not surprisingly, developing countries also
urged a more equitable distribution of the burdens of adjustment as
part of their calls for a New International Economic Order in the
1970s.28'
Japan is the classic example of a surplus country that had not recy-
cled its surplus. Japan has out-traded the rest of the world, but it is
sitting on a mountain of foreign reserves, and it is now choking on
those surpluses. 82 In contrast, after World War II, the United States
created the European Recovery Program, which lasted from 1947 to
1951. Also known as the Marshall Plan, this effort by the United
States government gave $13 billion (more than $150 billion in to-
day's dollars) in foreign aid in just a four year period to rebuild the
economies of Western Europe. 83
"' See id. (arguing that the IMF or others should devise a means to encourage
countries in current account surpluses to make "long-term loans to deficit coun-
tries that are undertaking needed adjustment").
22 See Paul Abrahams, Japanese Trade Surplus Climbs To Record $122bn, FIN.
TIMES, Jan. 26, 1999, 16; Wayne Angell, How To Save Japan From Oversaving,
WALL ST. J., June 22, 1998, A22. For an early recognition and explanation of
Japan's economic weakness, see LYNN TURGEON, STATE AND DISCRIMINATION:
THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COLD WAR 98 (1989).
..3 See LYNN TURGEON, BASTARD KEYNESIANISM: THE EVOLUTION OF
ECONOMIC THINKING AND POLICYMAKING SINCE WORLD WAR II 7, 10, 59
(1996) (examining the beneficial effect of the Marshall Plan on the United States
economy); DIMAND, supra note 165, at 53 (discussing comparable United States
aid to Japan and the Anglo-American Financial Agreement, in which the United
States extended a $3.75 billion line of credit to Britain); JOSEPH M. JONES, THE
FIFTEEN WEEKS 239-56 (1955) (describing the role of the Marshall Plan in the
larger context of the reorganization of the world economy following World War
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The Marshall Plan stimulus was highly successful; by 1951, the
Marshall Plan countries had raised their industrial output by 40%.2 4
We often forget how much Western European and United States
prosperity owes to public-sector investment in long-term infrastruc-
ture and technologies, rather than short-term private hot money
flows. Moreover, post-war reconstruction of Western Europe oc-
curred behind the protection of capital and currency controls.!" Most
of Western Europe did not achieve currency convertibility until the
end of 1958,2Y and capital controls were not lifted until later. In fact,
some larger Western European countries did not fully remove capital
controls until the 1990s, obviously well after achieving significant
economic development.8 8 Yet, today the IMF expects developing
countries to reach economic take-off without restricting hot money
capital flows.
In omitting the history and success of the Marshall Plan, today's
dominant narratives about development serve to misinform public
discussion about global capital markets. For instance, in editorializ-
ing that capital controls would scare off foreign capital, the Econo-
II); Paul Davidson, Reforming the World's Money, 15 J. POST-KEYNESIAN
ECON. 153, 156 (1993) (enumerating the benefits of the Marshall Plan).
'84See JOHN BLUM, ET. AL., THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE 720 (1977).
2' See TURGEON, supra note 282, at 9-11 (explaining that United States post-war
prosperity depended in significant part upon military expenditures). The
groundwork for increased military spending was laid in early 1950, when Presi-
dent Truman signed a secret National Security Council memorandum NSC-68.
See id. NSC-68 was drafted by Leon Keyseling, the chair of the Council of Eco-
nomic Advisers, who was also instrumental in drafting the Employment Act of
1946. See id. During the Kennedy administration economic growth was once
again spurred by renewed military spending, space expenditures, and foreign aid.
See id. at 17.
26 See FRED L. BLOCK, THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DISORDER
109 (1977) (noting that at the beginning of the 1950s "no major European cur-
rency was convertible"); GARRITSEN DE VRIES, supra note 268, at 30-32.
m See GARRITSEN DE VRIES, supra note 268, at 30-32.
28 See Mussa & Goldstein, supra note 96, at 52.
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mist offered a photo of a construction site above the caption: "The
benefit of foreign capital,"'289 by which the Economist meant private
foreign capital. This view conveniently ignores the fact that much of
Western Europe's post-war construction sites stemmed from the
Marshall Plan, which provided a public-sector transfer of capital
during a time of widespread currency and capital controls.
More revealing is how the dominant neoliberal view reflects the
ethics of a hard core drug dealer. The euphoria of the short-term in-
flow somehow justifies the addiction,29° no matter how ephemeral and
illusory the prosperity appears after the crash, no matter the inevita-
ble outcome of lost jobs and broken dreams. But the free market
pushers of hot money flows do not expect to be the ones waking up
with hangovers after the party is over. They will not even imagine
such a fate. Their calls for more austerity for deficit countries that
fall victim to the hot money addiction show that they refuse to accept
any degree of responsibility for the results of their actions. 9 '
Finally, once again, it is instructive to compare the United States
recycling of its surplus through the Marshall Plan with what Japan
has done with its own surplus.2 9 2 By recycling its post-war surplus,
the United States essentially accepted its share of the burden of ad-
2"9 See Time to turn off the tap?, ECONOMIST, Sept. 12, 1998, at 83, 85.
29o See Stanley Fischer, Capital Account Liberalization and the Role of the IMF,
Paper Prepared for the IMF Seminar "Asia and the IMF, " Sept. 19, 1997, (visited
June 8, 1999) <http://www.imf.org/ external/np/speeches/1997/091997.htm> (de-
scribing in laudatory terms the benefits that private capital inflows brought to
Asian countries and arguing that capital account liberalization should be a priority
worldwide); see also Robert E. Rubin, Remarks to the Dow Jones! Wall Street
Journal Annual Conference on the Americas, Oct. 1, 1998, (visited June 8, 1999)
<http://www.ustreas.gov/ press /release/pr2729.html> (reaffirming support for the
free flow of capital and greater adherence to "market discipline").
", According to Franhois Gianviti, the General Counsel of the IMF, a basic tenet
of the IMF is "that the resolution of external debt problems due to a major capi-
tal outflow was not the responsibility of the [International Monetary] Fund, but
was the responsibility of the country facing this outflow... [i]n an age of liberali-
zation of capital markets, these principles may seem antiquated, but they are still
in force and must be observed." See Gianviti, supra note 157, at 775
2Q2 See North-South supra note 280.
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justment. Western Europe used those Marshall Plan funds to pur-
chase United States products and to pay United States construction
companies, and in that way, the Marshall Plan helped to sustain de-
mand in the United States economy as well.293 Japan, on the other
hand, sat on its vast surplus of reserves, and instead of recycling
through massive foreign aid,29 Japan sunk those funds into specula-
tion in stock and real estate markets and created financial bubbles
that inevitably burst.295 This resulted in a dangerous price deflation
and recession in the world's second largest economy.6 The major
industrialized countries, including the United States, have also re-
fused to recycle their reserves to ease Russia's transition from com-
munism to market capitalism. It is not surprising that, in the after-
math of the Russian ruble collapse, many Russians now feel betrayed
293See TURGEON, supra note 283, at 10, 59.
294Japan has only lately started to focus on recycling its surplus as part of a res-
cue package for Asia. See Frances Williams, UNCTAD Backs Japan s S100bn
Asia Aid Plan, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1998, at 9 (noting that the aid program
would have a greater impact on Japanese GDP than a similar-sized domestic fis-
cal stimulus); see also Stephen Fidler & Gillian Tett, Japan joins World Bank to
backAsia bonds, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1998, at 1 (describing a plan to help reflate
Asian economies). Japan's efforts, however, have not found support in the
United States. See Robert Wade & Frank Venerose, The Resources Lie Within,
ECONOMIST, Nov. 7, 1998, at 19-21 (stating that in August of 1997, the United
States Treasury Department effectively blocked a S 100 billion Japanese proposal
for an Asian Monetary Fund to deal with Asian financial crisis); Edward A. Gar-
gan, Asian Nations Affirm LM.F. As Primary Provider ofAid, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
20, 1997, at C2 (describing how the United States rejected the Japanese plan to
create an Asian-only fund to supplement IMF assistance).
29" See David P. Hamilton, So. How Far Has Japan Fallen? Take a Look at
These Numbers, WALL ST. J., July 2, 1998, at A19.
As a sign of the deflationary dangers in Japan, market interest rates fell below
zero, an almost unheard-of phenomenon, prompting the Japanese central bank to
purchase massive amounts of corporate debt in an attempt to stave off a liquidity
squeeze. See Gillian Tett & Edward Luce, Yen Deposit Rates Fall to Below Zero,
FIN. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1998, at I (describing how depositors were willing to accept
sub-zero interest rates because of lack of other destinations for Yen assets); see
also Gillian Tett & Edward Luce, Man and Machine Mystified 1y Negative In-
terest Rates, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1998, at 6; Gillian Tett, Bank of Japan Steps
in to Buy More Corporate Debt, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1998, at 22.
1999] 1641
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
by the West. 97
F. THE SCARCE CURRENCY CLAUSE AND OTHER TRADE TACTICS
Pressure could also be brought to bear on surplus countries to re-
cycle their surpluses through the IMF Articles. Article VII is the so-
called "scarce currency clause" which permits the IMF to identify a
chronic surplus country, declare its currency as a scarce currency,
and allow the rest of the world to discriminate against that country's
imports.298 Unfortunately, the scarce currency clause has never been
invoked. Consequently, the IMF took a "highly asymmetrical" ap-
proach to adjustment by placing the major burden of policy change
and adjustment on deficit countries.3 0 But a credible threat to effec-
tively use the scarce currency clause might pressure a surplus coun-
try to recycle its reserves to deficit countries.3
Even international trade law supports the use of trade restrictions
297 See Michael Wines, Hostility to U.S. is Now Popular with Russians, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 12, 1999, at A5; see also supra notes 242-243 and accompanying text.
298 See Articles, supra note 156, art. VII, sec. 3(a) (providing for the authority to
declare a general scarcity of a particular currency); see id. sec. 3(b) (authorizing
any member, after consultation with the Fund, to temporarily impose limitations
on the freedom of exchange operations in the scarce currency); see also BLOCK,
supra note 286, at 52.
2'9 Indeed, the IMF's General Counsel does not even mention the scarce currency
clause as an exception to the Articles' prohibition against restrictions on current
transactions. See Gianviti, supra note 157, at 775-76.
"" See Stewart, supra note 272, at 472. According to Sir Roy Harrod, Article VII,
sec. 3(b) may violate the multilateral principle at the base of the IMF, thereby
making the operation of the scarce currency clause "a purely bilateral matter
between each separate member and the scarce currency country". See RoY F.
HARROD, THE DOLLAR 110 (1954) (arguing that multilateral application would
permit more effective operation of the scarce currency clause).
", During the 1970's, the managing director of the IMF, Mr. de Larosiere, advo-
cated such recycling by urging surplus countries to increase their official devel-
opment financing to help deficit countries develop their infrastructure, their re-
source base, and sustain their living standards. See GARRITSEN DE VRIES, supra
note 268, at 174, 228.
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to maintain a balance of payments equilibrium if the restrictions
comply with principles of non-selectivity and nondiscrimination. Ar-
ticle XII of the GATT, as adopted by the WTO, permits the use of
import controls if the achievement and maintenance of full employ-
ment generates a high level of demand for imports that threaten a
country's monetary reserves. 02 In order to safeguard its external fi-
nancial position and achieve full employment, a contracting party
"may restrict the quantity or value of merchandise permitted to be
imported."3' 3 If properly interpreted and applied, international trade
law could encourage chronic surplus countries to bear more of the
burdens of adjustment3 4
VI. FINDING OPPORTUNITY IN STABILITY
The full implications of the range of these proposed reforms are
compelling. First and foremost, countries would be free to pursue
and maintain economic growth and full employment without exces-
sive fear of currency contagion and economic collapse. Most elected
governments are presently caught between a rock and a hard place,
trying to respond to the needs of their citizens, but also attempting to
placate the demands of industrialized countries, multilateral lending
institutions, and private financial markets."0 5
302 See Wynne Godley, A Critical hnbalance in U.S. Trade: The U.S. Balance of
Payments, Iternational Indebtedness, and Economic Policy, PUB. POL'Y BRIEF
No. 23 (Jerome Levy Economics Institute, Annandale-on-Hudson) 1995, at 25
(noting that the WTO modifications to GATT Article XII express a preference
for "price-based" measures over quantitative controls).
303 See id.
31 One way for surplus countries to bear adjustment burdens would be encour-
aging them to import more from deficit countries. See Guy de Jonquieres, US
asks EU to Ease Import Curbs to Aid World Economy, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 19,
1998, at 1; Peter Montagnon & Sheila McNutty, Attempts at APEC Deal Fail as
Japan Resists Tariff Cuts, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1998, at 18.
30 See Paul Lewis, World Bank Says Pover" Is Increasing, N.Y. Times, June 3,
1999, at C7; see also Latest World Bank Poverty Update Shows Urgent Need to
Better Shield Poor in Crises, NEWS RELEASE No. 99122141S, June 2, 1999
<http://vww.worldbank.org /html/extdr/extme2214.htm> (reporting that, as a re-
sult of the global currency contagion and misguided adjustment policies and aus-
terity responses, the number of people living on less than S1 per day rose from 1.2
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Today's so-called "Wall Street-Washington" consensus that is
supported and advanced by the IMF and the United States Treasury
Department assumes that one size fits all. Such a view holds that
there is only one path for development, and only one way for a gov-
ernment to organize its economy and society.0 This approach is eth-
nocentric and undermines other non-financial values. As a result,
there have been profound dislocations around the world, as govern-
ments dismantle universal entitlements and social safety nets to fit
the IMF's very narrow conception of sound finance.
0 7
A reformed and truly progressive global financial architecture that
permits full employment would present a return to the original pur-
poses of the Bretton Woods agreement." 8 It would begin to reverse
the destructive trends towards high real interest rates, widespread
underemployment, slow or declining economic growth, high poverty
levels, and stagnant incomes that beset submerging market countries
in recent months and years.9 These reforms would enable central
billion to 1.5 billion from 1987 to 1999).
'0' See Bhagwati, supra note 141, at 10 (referring to the confluence of interests
supporting neo-liberalized hot money capital flows as "the Wall Street-Treasury
complex").
,7 For instance, Latin American countries have been under pressure to cut back on
social services to placate the IMF and private investment community. See Diana
Jean Schemo, Brazil Congress Votes to Scale Down Social Security Benefits, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 13, 1998, at A5 (describing moves to restrict social security eligibility
and benefits and to water down an environmental crimes law, intended to "lift the
confidence of intemational investors"); see also Frederico Grayeb, Argentina's
Values, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1998, at A26 (finding Argentina's state-provided
universal health care, free public universities, legal protections from layoffs, and
six-month matemity leave threatened by the Americanization of its economic cul-
ture).
38 See Articles supra note 169 and accompanying text; Ilene Grabel, Crossing
Borders: A Case for Cooperation in International Financial Markets, CREATING A
NEW WORLD ECONOMY: FORCES OF CHANGE AND PLANS OF ACTION 64 (Gerald
Epstein, Julie Graham, Jessica Nembhard, eds., Temple University Press, 1993).
'o9 See Global Financial Crisis Will Trigger Jump in World Unemployment, Press
Release on the ILO World Employment Report, 1998-99, Sept. 24, 1998, (visited
June 8, 1999) <http://www/ilo.org/ public/english/235press/pr/1998/33.html> (es-
timating that more than one billion people, or one-third of the world's labor force,
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banks to deliver much lower interest rates and elected governments
to use fiscal policy for a broad range of economic and social pur-
poses, without fear that capital would flee a country's currency." '
While owners of financial capital may not cherish such lower real
interest rates, these rates would certainly prove very beneficial for
the health of industrial capital and social enterprise.
A more stable regime would present different opportunities for so-
cial progress and private profit. While there might not be the shotgun
marriage of United States investment and Mexican banking, greater
opportunities for prosperity and profit in the trade of real goods and
services, and increased commerce and tourism may result from sta-
bility between these neighbors."' Hopefully some of these broader
questions will be introduced in discussions by considering the
mechanisms by which today's financial regime has actually impeded
progress in Mexico, the United States and around the globe, and by
considering the challenges that confront our efforts to reform today's
speculative regime into a more stable system of relations.
are unemployed or underemployed).
3'0 For recent examples of IMF-imposed hardship, see Clifford Krauss, Argentina:
Students Protest Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1999, at A6 (describing nationwide
student protests over government plans to cut S280 million from the Education
Ministry as part of agreement with the IMF to cut S 1.4 billion in overall spending);
see also Richard Chacon, Tuition Hike Sparks Fight Over Merico University's
Mission, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 25, 1999, at A3 (describing a student strike that
shut down Mexico's largest public university to protest a proposed tuition increase
from twenty cents to S120 per semester as part of the government's IMF-backed
austerity measures); Julia Preston, Student Strike in Capital Jarring All of Merico,
N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1999, at A8 (student strike has closed down classrooms for
more than three months for 270,000 students at Mexico's largest university, the
National Autonomous University of Mexico; after the university's governing
council voted to cancel obligatory tuition payments, protests have expanded to op-
pose the role of private enterprise in Mexican society).
3l1 As part of a program to restore monetary sovereignty and full employment,
Keynes sympathized with calls to minimize economic and particularly financial
entanglements. See John Maynard Keynes, National Self Sufficiency, in THE
COLLECTED WRITINGS OF JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES 233, 236 (D. Moggridge ed.,
1982) (asserting that "[i]deas, knowledge, art, hospitality, travel - these are the
things which should of their nature be international... [b]ut ... above all, let fi-
nance be primarily national").
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